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 Executive Summary 
 
Characteristic of the developments in science and technology over the past three decades 
is the explosive nature of the accumulation of knowledge concerning the mechanisms and 
functions of biological systems. In this regard, the associations between science and 
technology and political decision-making processes within the context of arms control 
negotiations were at the centre of this investigation. In the light of the collapse of 
negotiations in Geneva over a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention (BWC), a new assessment of these associations is all the more urgent.  
A scientifically based analysis of the possibilities for misuse of developments for the 
production of biological weapons was carried out in order to make particular risk areas for 
arms control and verification of biological weapons more visible. Clear evidence was 
obtained for a paradigm shift in the CBW proliferation problem with its focus moving away 
from the malign manipulation of microorganisms to cause infectious diseases to the 
possibility of using biochemical agents as weapons to specifically target the operation of 
interacting biological systems in the human body. Two vital, interacting systems - the 
neuroendocrine and the immune systems with their double vulnerability to modulation-were 
analysed in this context. The analysis of these two systems regarding in the life sciences 
illustrates that much of the growing knowledge is dual-use and could be subject to hostile 
misuse if the prohibitionary norm embodied in the BWC is not upheld in coming decades. 
Although the controls of science and technology that are increasingly taking shape in the 
United States point in the right direction, they face the same shortcomings as do the 
deliberations by states parties to the BWC in the so-called new process created by the last 
BWC Review Conference: both of these attempts do not lead to coordinated action on the 
international level and are thus decoupled from developing the regime as a whole. 
The prohibitionary norm of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is also under threat 
by developments in science and technology. Indeed, many of the products flowing from the 
revolutions in biotechnology and pharmacology that can impact life processes at various 
levels are basically chemical compounds that have relevance for both the BWC and the 
CWC. Negotiators of the CWC have provided for a procedure to review developments in 
science and technology by creating the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to advise the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on science and technology 
matters. This body has expressed its concerns about the development of riot control 
agents and other so-called “non-lethal” chemical weapons. However, S&T issues did not 
have a prominent position on the agenda of the First Review Conference of the CWC. In 
order to prevent the misuse of twenty-first century chemistry, CWC implementation cannot 
continue as if the regime existed in a time warp. Otherwise, science and technology 
advances in chemistry, biology and the life sciences in general can be expected to again 
leave their mark on military thinking and the history of warfare. 
Finally, the results of these analyses were used to examine how to devise an overarching 
framework that would tie together all the measures that have been proposed and that will 
be needed additionally to counter biochemical warfare. 
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 Zusammenfassung 
 
In den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten ist das akkumulierte Wissen über die Mechanismen 
und Funktionen biologischer Systeme durch wissenschaftliche und technologische 
Entwicklungen explosionsartig gewachsen. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht untersucht 
die Wechselwirkung von naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung, insbesondere in der 
Biotechnologie und Molekularbiologie, und politischem Steuerungshandeln im Bereich der 
Rüstungskontrolle. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Krise der Genfer 
Verhandlungen über ein Verifikationsprotokoll zum „Übereinkommen über das Verbot der 
Entwicklung, Herstellung und Lagerung bakteriologischer (biologischer) Waffen und 
Toxinwaffen“ (BWÜ) ist es dringend erforderlich, den Handlungsbedarf für die 
Rüstungskontrollpolitik neu zu bestimmen. 
 
Die Verfasser untersuchten die Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten neuer Forschungserkenntnisse 
und Technologieentwicklungen für die Herstellung von Biowaffen auf der Grundlage einer 
naturwissenschaftlichen Analyse. In der Studie konnten besondere „Risikobereiche“ 
identifiziert und sichtbar gemacht werden, die für die Rüstungskontrollpolitik und für 
Verifikationssysteme zu biologischen Waffen von grundlegender Bedeutung sind. Hierbei 
traten deutliche Hinweise auf einen Paradigmenwechsel bei den Proliferationsgefahren für 
biologische und chemische Waffen zutage: Lag die Hauptgefahr bisher im Einsatz 
modifizierter Mikroorganismen, um Infektionskrankheiten auszulösen, so steht nun die 
Möglichkeit im Vordergrund, biochemische Agenzien als Waffen zu benutzen, um gezielt 
die Funktionsweise und Interaktion biologischer Systeme im menschlichen Körper 
anzugreifen. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung standen zwei lebenswichtige, miteinander 
verbundene physiologische Systeme - das Nerven- und das Immunsystem, die eine 
doppelte Verletzbarkeit durch Manipulationen aufweisen und somit eine grundsätzliche 
Relevanz für die biochemische Rüstungskontrolle besitzen. Eine Analyse dieser Systeme 
im Kontext jüngster Entwicklungen in den Lebenswissenschaften (Life Sciences) 
verdeutlicht, dass ein Großteil des gestiegenen Wissens einen dual-use-Charakter hat und 
somit für nicht-friedliche Zwecke missbraucht werden kann, sofern die Verbotsnormen des 
BWÜ in dem kommenden Jahrzehnten nicht angepasst werden. Die Kontrollen von 
Wissenschaft und Technologieentwicklung, wie sie in letzter Zeit in vermehrtem Ausmaß in 
den Vereinigten Staaten eingerichtet wurden, weisen zwar in die richtige Richtung. Sie 
sind jedoch mit denselben Unzulänglichkeiten behaftet, die auch die Konferenzen der 
BWÜ-Vertragsstaaten kennzeichnen. Auch die Maßnahmen im Rahmen des so genannten 
„neuen Prozesses“, der auf der letzten Überprüfungskonferenz des BWÜ initiiert wurde, 
führten nicht zu koordinierten Vorgehensweisen auf der internationalen Ebene und sind 
somit nicht in die Regimeentwicklung integriert. 
 
Die Verbotsnormen des Chemiewaffenübereinkommens (CWÜ) geraten durch die 
dynamische Entwicklung von Forschung und Technologie ebenfalls in Gefahr. Zahlreiche 
Produkte, die aus der neueren Biotechnologie und Pharmakologie hervorgegangen sind, 
können Lebensprozesse auf den verschiedensten Ebenen beeinflussen. Sie bestehen im 
Wesentlichen aus chemischen Verbindungen, die sowohl für das BWÜ als auch für das 
CWÜ von Relevanz sind. Die Verhandlungsführer des CWÜ sprachen sich für die 
Gründung eines wissenschaftlichen Beratungsgremiums (Scientific Advisory Board) aus, 
um Entwicklungen in Forschung und Technologie überprüfen zu können und die 
Überwachungsorganisation für das Verbot chemischer Waffen (OPWC) in Den Haag in 
diesen Fragen zu beraten. Dieses Gremium äußerte seine Bedenken über die Entwicklung 
von so genannten riot control agents und anderen „nichttödlichen“ chemischen 
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 Waffensystemen. Trotzdem spielten Fragen der Forschung und Technologieentwicklung 
auf der Ersten Überprüfungskonferenz des CWÜ keine bedeutende Rolle. Wenn der 
Missbrauch der modernen Chemie im 21. Jahrhundert verhindert werden soll, darf die 
Umsetzung des CWÜ nicht in einer Weise fortgesetzt werden, als ob die wissenschaftliche 
und technologische Basis unverändert bliebe. Andernfalls ist zu befürchten, dass die 
wissenschaftlichen und technologischen Entwicklungen in der Chemie und Biologie sowie 
in den Lebenswissenschaften im Allgemeinen erneut ihre Spuren im militärischen Denken 
und in der Geschichte der Kriegsführung hinterlassen werden. 
Die Ergebnisse der Forschungsarbeiten dienten dazu, einen übergreifenden Rahmen zu 
entwerfen, der die bereits vorhandenen Vorschläge mit den zusätzlich erforderlichen 
Maßnahmen zusammenführt, um einer künftigen biochemischen Kriegsführung 
entgegenzuwirken. 
 6
 1 Introduction 
 
The norm against the deliberate use of poison and disease in warfare can be traced back 
several hundred if not thousand years. This ‘taboo’ became embodied in the 20th Century 
in three international treaties which form the basis of the two chemical and biological 
weapons prohibition regimes that are still today the major instruments in the fight against 
the spread of biological and chemical weapons proliferation and use. The three legal 
instruments are the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  
The 1925 Geneva Protocol came about as a reaction against the misuse of modern 
chemistry in the form of ‘gas’ warfare during World War I. It prohibits the use of chemical 
and biological - or, as in the terminology of the day, ‘bacteriological’ - weapons in warfare. 
Not prohibited are for example development and stockpiling of chemical or biological 
warfare agents. In addition, many states parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol attached 
unilateral reservations to their ratifications, which limited the scope of the Protocol even 
further. During the second half of the 1960s negotiations to comprehensively prohibit 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) were separated, which in turn led to the 
conclusion of the 1972 BWC. While the BWC was hailed as the first multilateral agreement 
to ban a whole class of weapons of mass destruction, the 1993 CWC has to be regarded 
as one of the most advanced instruments of multilateral arms control. The CWC not only 
bans a category of weapons of mass destruction, but is the first such multilateral treaty that 
sets up a new international organisation for the verification of treaty provisions.  
It has become clear over the last few years, however, that the adequacy of the two 
prohibition regimes which aim at preventing the hostile use of chemistry and biology for 
offensive military or for terrorist purposes has been seriously called into question. This is 
due to a series of interrelated events and trends: 
 
• The nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 by the apocalyptical 
sect Aum Shinrikyo has often been called a ‘wake-up call,’ refocusing attention as to 
the potential sources of a CBW attack.2 In addition, the anthrax letters sent through 
the US mail system in 2001 seemed to confirm that terrorists can use biological 
weapons. 
• With respect to the BWC, however, the most glaring gap in the controls of this treaty is 
the absence of a verification system that would be able to confirm the treaty compliant 
behaviour of BWC states parties or uncover violations of the treaty. Also, the parallel 
process of strengthening the BWC through a legally binding international instrument 
(protocol to the BWC) that was started in 1991 came to an abrupt - and unsuccessful - 
3
 
 up to 
                                                
end in July 2001.   
• The chemical weapons prohibition regime is much farther developed than its BW 
counterpart. Yet, a number of problems have come to the fore, the two most important
of which relate first, to the implementation of several CWC provisions and second, to 
the unwillingness in part of a number of CWC states parties to keep the regime
 
2  See D. E. Kaplan and A. Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World. London: Hutchinson, 1996; M. Leitenberg, The 
Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents, In: B. Roberts (ed.), Hype or Reality: The 
”New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks. Alexandria, VA: CBACI, 2000, pp.159-170. 
3  Dando, M.R.: Preventing Biological Warfare. The Failure of American Leadership Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
2002. 
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 date with a view to adapting verification provisions to the changing face of the 
chemical industries worldwide.  
• The issue of so-called ‘non-lethal’ or ‘less than lethal’ chemical weapons. During 
in 
s of scientific experiments and their subsequent publication suggests 
that the range and possibilities for malign use of biology and chemistry have greatly 
f the 
s 
of the implications this change in our understanding 
 two 
d it 
gh to 
f 
sue 
ted: if 
 nor use chemical or biological weapons then the goal of 
                                                
recent years there seems to have been an increase in interest in toxic incapacitants 
the US, Russia and other countries.  
• Lastly, a serie
increased.4  
 
While these experiments of concern mostly represent another variation of the theme of 
modifying or “improving” disease-causing agents, there is different, more fundamental 
change under way in the life sciences. This paradigm shift is fuelled by the decoding o
human genome and finds its expression in the establishment of new scientific subfield
such as systems biology. This means that the current scientific and technological 
revolution in the life sciences changes the focus of the proliferation problem from the 
chemical or biological warfare agent as the object of malign manipulation to the 
physiological target in the human body as the object of attack. The revolution in the life 
sciences cannot but raise the question 
of the human body at the molecular level will have for the normative structure of the
prohibition regimes currently in place. 
In general terms the CBW threat is best conceived of as a chemical and biological 
spectrum ranging from classical lethal chemical warfare agents on one end to toxic 
industrial chemicals and on to mid-spectrum toxins and bioregulators. On the other en
ranges from traditional to genetically modified biological warfare agents on throu
newly designed agents. It is to be expected that the scope and pace of scientific and 
technological change in the life sciences will affect all aspects of this spectrum. 
The two prohibition regimes in their current shape are ill equipped to prevent the misuse o
scientific and technological advances across the spectrum of the revolution in the life 
sciences. The goal, then, has to be to adapt the CW and BW prohibition regimes so that 
they provide an adequate framework for state action and interaction to address the 
challenges ahead. In this context we understand regime adequacy to be composed of 
regime effectiveness and regime robustness, two concepts which are interrelated, but not 
identical. Regime effectiveness on one hand falls broadly within the scholarly debates on 
international regimes.5 In these debates there is consensus that the effectiveness of an 
international regime has two dimensions: first it focuses on the question whether regimes 
affect state behaviour in the issue area they are set up to regulate. Secondly, regime 
effectiveness is measured by the impact the regime has on observable data in the is
area. In our area of concern the two aspects of regime effectiveness are closely rela
states do neither acquire
prohibiting these weapons has also been achieved - at least if the regime enjoys a 
universal membership.  
 
4  Jackson, R. J./Ramsay, A. J./Christensen, C./Beaton, S./Hall, D. F. R./Ramshaw, I. A.: Expression of mouse 
interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic 
resistance to mousepox. In: Journal of Virology 75 (2001), pp. 1205-1210; Cello, J./Paul, A.V./Wimmer, E.: Chemical 
synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. In: Science 297 
(2002), pp. 1016-1018. 
5  Levy, M.A. et al.: The study of international regimes. In: European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995), pp. 
267-330; Hasenclever, A./Mayer, P./Rittberger, V.: Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1997). 
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 On the other hand, a regime displays robustness when the actors’ expectations contin
converge around the regime’s normative structure, despite the occurrence of stress 
that challenge the regime. 
ue to 
factors 
ge. On the 
l 
 
e. Or such shifts can be caused 
nces 
expected to undermine the adequacy of the CW and BW prohibition regimes, if 
ese advances are left unattended. In order to address this concern we raise four 
mine the two 
. Which adaptations of the CW and BW prohibition regimes are needed to bring them 
es? 
he following chapters will address these questions. 
 
                                                
6 Müller et.al.7 identify a number of stress factors that can 
undermine a regime’s robustness, two of which are of particular importance for our 
purposes: technological change and shifts in the distribution of power. Many security 
regimes exist in issue areas which are influenced heavily by technological chan
one hand, technological developments can create new problems which are no longer 
adequately covered by regime rules and procedures. On the other hand, such 
developments might offer new tools for problem-solving, thereby creating the impression 
that existing instruments have become obsolete. Regardless of its direction, technologica
change, if left unattended over longer periods of time, can undermine regime robustness
and thus necessitate the formulation of new regime norms and rules. The likelihood that 
such adaptations are made is influenced to a considerable degree by the distribution of 
power among regime members. Shifts in power distribution can have their origins outside 
the regime and well be able to transgress the regimes scop
by technological breakthroughs in the issue area a regime regulates, which benefits only 
one or a small group of states participating in the regime. 
Our central concern then is with scientific and technological advances in the life scie
that can be 
th
questions: 
 
1. How are the CW and BW prohibition regimes set up to deal with scientific and 
technological (S&T) changes affecting the issue areas these regimes are to regulate? 
2. What are the areas of concern in terms of S&T advances that might under
regimes’ adequacy? 
3. How well equipped are the two regimes to deal with the new challenges? 
4
into line with the realities of 21st century life scienc
 
T
 
 
 
 
 
6  Hasenclever, A./Mayer, P./Rittberger, V.: Fair Burden-Sharing and the Robustness of International Regimes: The 
Case of Food Aid. Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung Nr.31. Tübingen (1998), 
p.1. 
7  Müller, H. et al.: Regime unter Stress. Beharrungs- und Anpassungsleistungen internationaler Regime unter den 
Bedingungen existenzgefährdender Herausforderungen. Frankfurt/Main: PRIF, February 1999, pp. 10-11, 15-24, 
unpublished manuscript. 
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 2 Science, Technology and the CBW Regimes 
 
Advances in science and technology (S&T) can have both positive and negative effects on 
societies and the relations among them. In chemistry, biology and the life sciences more 
generally the intention of scientists doing cutting-edge research will generally be to better 
the human condition, such as through the development of new medicines. However, a 
considerable number of chemical compounds and micro organisms have potential for 
harmful, as well as beneficial, effects.  
Many toxic chemicals, their precursors, as well as pathogens and processes involved in 
their production have perfectly legitimate civilian applications. At the same time the history 
of chemistry and biology provides ample examples of new discoveries in these areas being 
used for weapons’ purposes. Thus, the dual-use character of toxic chemicals and 
pathogenic micro organisms is not just an abstract quality they possess. Rather, the 
different purposes to which these substances and organisms can be put have had 
profound implications on military thinking and - in the case of chemical weapons (CW) - the 
history of warfare. Any effort to control the use of toxic chemicals or pathogenic micro 
organisms for offensive military purposes has to take into account the dual-use nature of 
many of these chemicals, organisms and related equipment and processes. 
The next section will present a discussion of present control mechanisms for chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) and how they relate to the state of development of the life 
sciences. The final section will analyse how the biotechnology revolution might impact the 
future of CBW controls. Given the availability of detailed analyses of some aspects of the 
biotechnology revolution and its impact on BW controls, in general this paper will focus 
more on the impact on CW controls. 
 
 
2.1 Present CBW Control Mechanisms and Their Relationship to  
Developments in the Life Sciences8 
 
The CBW control regimes go back to the 1925 “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare”. The Protocol was originally conceived as a response to the widespread use of 
CW during the First World War, and only upon a Polish initiative were ‘bacteriological 
methods of warfare’ included into the Protocol text. It entered into force in 1928 and has 
currently 133 member states. Today, the CBW regimes revolve around two international 
treaties: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)9 and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC).10 
The CWC was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 
1997. It bans the development, production, use and retention of CW and requires states 
                                                 
8  Kelle, A./Nixdorff, K./Dando, M.: Controlling Biochemical Weapons. Adapting Multilateral Arms Control for the 21st 
Century, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2006, 208 pp.; Aftalion, F.: A History of the International Chemical 
Industry. From the “Early Days” to 2000 (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Chemical Heritage Press, (2001), especially pp. 32-
101; Robinson, J.P.:1998, The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: a historical overview. 
In: Bothe,M./Ronzitti, N./Rosas, A. (eds.): The New Chemical Weapons Convention-Implementation and Prospects. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International (1998), pp. 17-36. 
9  Also known as the BTWC. See <http://www.opbw.org> for the convention’s text and most review conference 
documents issued over the thirty-year history of the BWC. 
10  See <http://www.opcw.org> for the CWC’s text and other useful related information. 
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 possessing CW to destroy them over a ten-year period. The dual-use problem led to the 
inclusion in the CWC of the so-called general purpose criterion. According to this provision, 
toxic chemicals that could be misused as CW are not prohibited altogether. Negotiators of 
the CWC also realized that the area the convention regulates would be subject to 
advances in S&T. They have therefore provided for a procedure to review these 
developments at CWC review conferences and created the Scientific Advisory Board 
(SAB) to advise the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on 
S&T matters. 
Chemical warfare agents and means for their production are based on long-established, 
well-known and proven technologies. Thus, a potential proliferator does not necessarily 
have to look for the latest developments in chemistry or related disciplines to obtain a 
militarily significant CW capability. Nevertheless, at least three developments are taking 
place in both the civilian and military applications of chemistry that might well change the 
way we (need to) think about chemical warfare agents and the ways and means to prevent 
the misuse of toxic chemicals for offensive military purposes. Two of these developments - 
the evolution of chemical industry, and the renewed interest in “non-lethal” weapons - are 
directly linked to the CW control regime and its effectiveness. The third one, the impact of 
the biotechnology revolution on the long-term viability or robustness of the CW control 
regime, will be discussed in the final section. 
 
 
2.1.1 Evolution of the Chemical Industry 
 
Two developments in the chemical industry pose particular challenges to the verification of 
the peaceful applications of toxic chemicals. First, there is a clear trend away from the 
continuous production of large quantities of a chemical in a facility specifically designed for 
the purpose. Rather, many companies increasingly rely on the use of smaller, more 
versatile production facilities, which can be adapted from the production of a batch of one 
chemical to another one in a short period of time. Such facilities could easily fall through 
the cracks of the declaration and inspection system of the CWC. Utilization of such batch-
production facilities would theoretically enable a potential proliferator to distribute the 
production of CW precursor chemicals or even chemical warfare agents themselves 
among a number of such facilities to avoid detection. 
Secondly, over the last decade a considerable number of traditional chemical firms were 
broken up and replaced by so-called “industrial parks”. This poses a potential problem for 
verification under the CWC as the convention’s definitions that form the basis for the 
verification measures assume the existence of plant sites - which were prevalent in the late 
1980s when the CWC was negotiated. Verification procedures have to be adapted to the 
changed environment. However, many CWC states parties are not inclined to support such 
an adaptation. Instead they argue that the OPCW’s industry verification activities should 
remain unchanged, thereby risking that the regime will become irrelevant due to 
developments in chemical industry at some point in the future.11 
                                                 
11  Kelle, A.: The CWC after its first review conference: is the glass half full or half empty? In: Disarmament Diplomacy 71 
(2003), pp. 31-40. 
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 2.1.2 Interest in “Non-lethal” Weapons 
 
Equally important, renewed interest in so-called “non-lethal” CW threatens to undermine 
the current control regime and calls into question its future robustness. If there was the 
need for a wake-up call to raise awareness of this problem, this was most certainly 
provided by the use of a “fentanyl-derivative” - as it was called by Russian authorities - to 
end the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002.12 However, this incident represents just the 
tip of the iceberg, as Russia is not the only state interested in utilizing “non-lethal” CW in a 
number of police and military scenarios other than war. Certainly the US military shows a 
strong interest in developing this kind of capability.13 
From a scientific and technical point of view the major problem with “non-lethal” weapons 
lies in the fact that they are not non-lethal, as the Moscow theatre situation has clearly 
demonstrated: about 130 of the 830 hostages died from the effects of the gas used. This 
represents a mortality rate of approximately 16%. In comparison, the chemical warfare 
agents of the First World War like chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas, which are 
prohibited under the CWC and listed on its schedules of chemicals, have a lethality of 
around 7%. 14 
Even if truly non-lethal CW were technically feasible, is it questionable whether their use 
would have the effect to merely incapacitate temporarily and not lead to the death of those 
exposed to the agents. Again, the Moscow theatre scenario offers some insights: Russian 
security forces obviously had orders to shoot the hostage-takers, which were incapacitated 
by the gas used in the theatre. Although this might have been the best way to ensure that 
none of the hostage-takers would be able to detonate their explosives, it reveals a central 
weakness of the argument of proponents of “non-lethal” CW. These incapacitants are often 
used in conjunction with lethal military force and in this context act mainly as a force 
multiplier and not as a life-saving tool. Exactly the same pattern of “non-lethal” CW usage 
occurred during the Viet Nam War, in which the US military employed 10 million pounds of 
the irritant CS.15 
Before the First CWC Review Conference a number of contributions on S&T developments 
of relevance to the CWC were made by NGOs, including the International Union of Pure 
and Applied Chemistry, which were then taken up by organs of the OPCW, states parties 
individually and most notably the SAB. 16 S&T issues did not, however, have a prominent 
position on the agenda of the Review Conference. Nevertheless, S&T issues-more 
specifically the Report of the SAB as submitted to the conference by the Director-General - 
resurfaced in the Review Document, both in the sections on general verification provisions 
and on activities not prohibited under the CWC. 
Although the topics of “non-lethal” weapons and chemical incapacitants received 
considerable attention in the run-up to the meeting, discussion on them was almost 
completely suppressed during the Conference. The only opportunity to discuss these 
matters publicly arose at the “Open Forum on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, hosted 
by the OPCW and supported by a number of NGOs. The Open Forum included a panel 
discussion entitled “The Chemical Weapons Ban and the Use of Incapacitants in Warfare 
                                                 
12  Wax, P.E./Becker, C.E./Curry, S.C.: Unexpected “gas” casualties in Moscow: a medical toxicology perspective. In: 
Annals of Emergency Medicine 41 (2003), pp. 700-705. 
13  See the website of the Sunshine Project for documentation of the US non-lethal weapons programmes, at 
<www.sunshine-project.org>. 
14  SIPRI: The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Volume I: The Rise of CB Weapons. Stockholm: Almqvist 
and Wiksell 1971, pp. 26-58. 
15  CBW. “Non-Lethal” weapons, the CWC and the BWC, Editorial. In: The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 61 (2003), p. 2. 
16  OPCW, Note by the Director-General. Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and 
Technology, document RC-1/DG.2. The Hague: United Nations, 23 April 2003, p. 15. 
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 and Law Enforcement”. Not surprisingly, then, the text of the Review Document did not 
contain any language explicitly referring to incapacitants or “non-lethal” weapons. 
However, the document did contain language in relation to the definitions in Article II of the 
Convention, pointing out that these were found by the conference to adequately cover 
developments in science and technology. 
Turning to biological weapons, the BWC stipulates in its Article I that: 
 
“Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances 
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes”. 17 
 
Like in the case of the CWC, the general purpose criterion not only makes it clear that 
peaceful uses of the biosciences are legitimate undertakings for states parties to the BWC, 
but also allows the use of pathogenic organisms or toxins in quantities and for purposes 
other than use as weapons. However, unlike the CW control regime, there are neither 
verification provisions foreseen in the BWC nor has an international organization been set 
up to oversee the implementation of the regime provisions. States parties are left to 
address S&T advances at the BWC review conferences and include their assessment as 
to relevant S&T developments and their impact on the BW control regime in the final 
documents issued by these conferences. Up to the Fifth Review Conference (2001-2002), 
successive review conferences have found the possible misuse of S&T advances in the life 
sciences to be covered by the scope of the BWC. 
Unfortunately, due to the failure to negotiate a Final Document during the Fifth Review 
Conference, the interpretations by BWC states parties concerning scientific advances of 
relevance to the BWC since the Fourth Review Conference (for over ten years) have not 
been recorded in a consensual document. 
 
 
2.2 The Biotechnology Revolution and the Future of CBW Controls 
 
It is commonly assumed that the biotechnology revolution and the increased utilization of 
genetic engineering will only impact the BW control regime, and not (or only marginally) the 
CW control regime. Yet what is often overlooked is the fact that many of the products 
flowing from the biotechnology revolution that can impact life processes at various levels 
are basically chemical compounds. All chemical compounds that have toxic properties fall 
under the prohibitions of the CWC. More specifically, the dangers stemming from an 
uncontrolled twenty-first century chemistry are twofold: first, new toxic biochemical 
compounds, which are highly effective at low dosage levels, could be developed and used 
as CW. This would undermine the prohibitory norm against CW. The second danger lies in 
the possible circumvention strategies for the production of known - or novel - CW agents, 
which these new technologies might offer to a determined proliferator. Developments with 
respect to both of these areas are likely to challenge our current understanding of what is a 
chemical weapon. 
                                                 
17  United Nations: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2826 (XXVI), 
United Nations, New York 1972. Full text available at <http://www.opbw.org>. 
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 The chemistry of the twenty-first century is a far cry from the one of the 1980s, which 
guided negotiations for the CWC verification regime. Chemistry now utilizes other scientific 
disciplines and technologies in its quest for new chemical compounds. Especially in the 
area of drug development and delivery, scientific and technological advances in 
biotechnology and genomics, robotics,18 information technology19 and nanotechnology20 
act as enablers of combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening, which in turn 
have become the driving forces in pharmaceutical research and development.21  
The genomics revolution, in particular progress in functional genomics (the ability to 
attribute specific functions to a particular gene), furthers our understanding of fundamental 
life processes at a molecular level. Clearly, all of this work is geared towards a better 
understanding of disease origins at the genetic level in order to treat or cure these 
diseases. However, the use of a “knock-out gas” in the Moscow theatre crisis serves as a 
powerful reminder that drugs with perfectly legitimate medical applications might be turned 
to a different use. Although in the Russian case this use was by state authorities, the 
spread of technologies and knowledge brings such misuse potential well within the reach 
of sub-state groups like terrorist organizations.  
The biotechnology revolution is producing vast amounts of new data, both in relation to 
genomes that are sequenced and new chemical compounds that are produced by 
combinatorial means and have to be screened for their properties and potential as new 
drugs. According to a conservative estimate,22 more than 1 million such compounds are 
screened each year in the US alone, 50,000 of which are subsequently eliminated from 
further consideration because of their toxic properties. Yet developments in this area are 
progressing rapidly as well: for example, a large-scale chemogenomics database was 
developed to “enhance and accelerate accurate interpretation of mechanisms of toxicity 
and pharmacology of chemicals and drugs.” The misuse potential of a system that allows 
for the identification of new chemical compounds according to their toxicity is obvious.23 As 
data mining algorithms become more elaborated,24 the potential to identify specific toxic 
effects of chemical compounds and exploit them for malign purposes will increase. 
The technology revolution across the life sciences will not only affect drug development but 
also drug delivery. As one recent review of the field has outlined, “currently, the most 
potential is offered by pulmonary delivery, i.e. inhalation of drugs to the deep lung.”25 In 
order for this to be effective it is necessary to create “drug particles or droplets … in the 
range [of] 1–5 microns.”26 This is exactly the particle size that was sought in the 
weaponisation of known CW and BW agents, making the dual-use aspects of new 
discoveries in this realm all too clear. The potential of misuse is compounded by the 
application of nanoparticles, which could either be used to increase the susceptibility of 
                                                 
18  Vogt, G.: Multi-axis robots bring automation to life sciences. In: Industrial Robot: An International Journal 29 (2002), 
pp. 49-52. 
19  Kraljevic, S./Stambrook, P.J./Pavelic, K:Accelerating drug discovery. EMBO reports 5 (2004), pp. 837-842. 
20  Sahoo, S.K./ Labhasetwar, V.: Nanotech approaches to drug delivery and imaging. In: Drug Discovery Today 8 
(2003), pp. 1112-20. 
21  Wood, A./Scott, A.: Combinatorial chemistry picks up speed. In: Chemical Week 162 (9 August 2000), pp. 39-42; 
Wheelis, M.: Biotechnology and biochemical weapons. In: The Nonproliferation Review 9 (2002), pp. 48-53. 
22  Wheelis, M: Biotechnology and biochemical weapons. In: The Nonproliferation Review 9 (2002), pp. 48-53. 
23  Ganter, B. /Tugendreich, S. /Pearson, C.l. et al.: Development of a large-scale chemogenomics database to improve 
drug candidate selection and to understand mechanisms of chemical toxicity and action. Journal of Biotechnology 119 
(2005), pp. 219-244. 
24  Whittaker, P.A.: What is the relevance of bioinformatics to pharmacology? In: Trends in Pharmacological Sciences 24 
(2003), pp. 34-39. 
25  Shohet, S./Wood, G.: Delivering biotherapeutics-technical opportunities and strategic trends. In: Journal of 
Commercial Biotechnology 9 (2002), pp. 59-66.  
26  Haystead, J.: New Particle Engineering Technology Improves Drug Solubility’, In: Pharmaceutical Technology 27, 
(2003), no.1, pp. 18-19 and 114. 
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 lung tissue to a CW agent or be directed at specific target tissue in the human body, such 
as in order to block defence mechanisms.27 
Similarly, with respect to the BW control regime, S&T developments - such as in the fields 
of immunology and neurology28 - are racing ahead. As no control mechanisms exist, the 
gap between technologies that should be monitored and controlled and actual controls 
being agreed upon and implemented is widening constantly. If this situation persists for 
much longer it is questionable whether the political will can be mustered to set up a 
multilateral system of controls that would actually provide warning of a misuse of cutting-
edge life-sciences research.  
Around the time of the Fifth BWC Review Conference, several developments in the life 
sciences occurred that many observers saw as opening wide the door for potential misuse. 
The “contentious research” in question involved:29 
 
• unintentionally potentiating the virulence of the mousepox virus through 
inserting an IL-4 gene into the mousepox genome; 
• synthesis of the poliovirus genome from “chemically synthesized 
oligonucleotides that were linked together and then transfected into cells”, 
thereby creating an infectious virus from scratch;30 and 
• potentiation of a potential virulence factor of vaccinia virus, which is of much 
lower virulence than the smallpox virus and usually used for vaccinations. 
 
Concerns over advances in S&T led the United States National Academies of Science to 
establish a committee to investigate ways to prevent S&T advances from being misused 
for hostile purposes.31 The so-called Fink Committee issued a set of recommendations to 
address the new environment in which the life sciences are operating and to prevent 
scientific advances from being misused by states or terrorist groups in BW programmes, 
while at the same time “enabling legitimate research to be conducted.”32 The Fink 
Committee’s recommendations included inter alia “self-governance by scientists and 
scientific journals to review publications for their potential national security risks” and the 
establishment of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) “to provide 
advice, guidance, and leadership for the system of review and oversight”.33 Before the 
publication of the Fink Committee’s report a group of thirty-two journal editors agreed in 
2003 on guidelines related to “Scientific Publication and Security”.34 
The NSABB has been established in the office of the director of the National Institutes of 
Health.35 It advises on and recommends “specific strategies for the efficient and effective 
oversight of federally conducted or supported dual-use biological research, taking into 
                                                 
27  Davis, S.S. 1997, Biomedical applications of nanotechnology-implications for drug targeting and gene therapy. Trends 
in Biotechnology, 15, pp. 217-224. 
28  See chapters 3 and 4. 
29  See the summaries of the three cases in National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on 
Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology: Biotechnology Research 
in an Age of Terrorism. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 2004, pp. 24 -29. 
30  Ibid. p. 27. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid. p. 32. 
33  Ibid. pp. 4 -12. 
34  Statement on Scientific Publication and Security, reprinted in National Research Council of the National Academies: 
Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press 2004, pp.98-99. 
35  See the NSABB’s website at <www.biosecurityboard.gov/>. 
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 consideration both national security concerns and the needs of the research community.”36 
The Board is composed of a maximum of twenty-five voting members whose areas of 
expertise cover inter alia genomics, bacteriology, virology, laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity, public health, pharmaceutical production, bioethics, national security, 
intelligence and law enforcement.37 
Although these parallel controls of S&T that are increasingly taking shape in the United 
States point in the right direction, they face the same shortcomings as do the deliberations 
by BWC states parties in the so-called new process created by the last BWC Review 
Conference: both of these attempts do not lead to coordinated action on the international 
level and are thus decoupled from developing the regime as a whole. Moreover, in the 
area of CW controls some of these measures would have to be taken on board as well. In 
order to prevent the misuse of twenty-first century chemistry, CWC implementation cannot 
continue as if the regime existed in a time warp. Otherwise, S&T advances in chemistry, 
biology and the life sciences in general can be expected to again leave their mark on 
military thinking and the history of warfare. 
                                                 
36  United States, Secretary of Health and Human Services: Charter. National Science and Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity. Washington, DC 2004, dated 4 March, available at <www.biosecurityboard.gov/SIGNED%20NSABB%20 
Charter.pdf>. 
37  Ibid., p. 2. 
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 3 Assault on Defenses: The Immune System Under 
Attack 
 
The immune system plays a crucial role in protecting against infectious diseases. This is 
clearly demonstrated in the case of individuals with genetic defects in certain immune 
mechanisms, which frequently result in a devastating infectious disease state and eventual 
death, despite the use of antibiotics or other chemotherapeutic agents. Indeed, the 
pathogenicity of a microorganism can only rightly be defined within the scope of its 
interaction with the immune system. To be a successful pathogen, a microorganism must 
possess strategies that enable it to evade immune defence mechanisms. Immune 
responses are regulated to a great extent through the production of cytokines, which are 
bioregulators that can exert both positive and negative effects depending upon the 
amounts produced. The immune system is thus very vulnerable to both immune evasion 
strategies and immune bioregulators, a situation that can be easily exploited for good or 
malign purposes. The central dual use role that the immune system plays in the context of 
life sciences research can be seen in the examples of research activities that have been 
frequently quoted in recent years as being potentially extremely dangerous. Most of these 
examples, including the mousepox experiment38 and the potentiation of a virulence factor 
of vaccinia virus39, involve the exploitation of immune evasion strategies. 
In just the past three decades we have witnessed an explosive accumulation of knowledge 
concerning the mechanisms and functions of the immune system. One area of immunology 
that has gained enormous importance and developed most rapidly just since the middle 
1990s is that of innate immunity. With the discovery of mammalian Toll-like receptors 
(TLRs)40 and their importance in governing the recognition of and response to different 
classes of microorganisms by cells41 of the innate immune system, research activity in this 
area of immunology has reached whirlwind proportions.  
The special position held by innate immunity relative to the control over infectious diseases 
can be seen by the fact that the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID) of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) expanded its program significantly in 
2003 to attract immunologists to the area of biodefense research.42 In this regard, NIAID 
reported that it “awarded a multi-component grant to create an ‘encyclopedia’ of innate 
immunity: a comprehensive and detailed picture of this ancient, essential first line of 
defense against bacterial and fungal diseases”. The stated goal of this undertaking is to 
gain knowledge that could lead to the development of treatments for infectious diseases. 
At the same time, however, this information could provide a blueprint for malign attack on 
the innate immune system. 
This chapter will try to show some of the directions that immunology is headed toward and 
the relevance this might have for future arms control. 
 
                                                 
38  Jackson et al. 2001, op. cit. 
39  Rosengard, A. M./Liu, Y./Nie, Z./Jimenez, R.: Variola virus immune evasion design: expression of a highly efficient 
inhibitor of human complement. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 99 (2002), pp. 8808-8813. 
40  Medzhitov, R./Preston-Hurlburt, P./Janeway, C.A., Jr.: A human homologue of the Drosophila Toll protein signals 
activation of adaptive immunity. In: Nature 388 (1997), pp. 394-397. 
41  Poltorak, A./He, X./Smirnova, I./Liu, M.Y./Huffel, C.V./Du, X./Birdwell, D./Alejos, E./Silva, M./Galanos, C. et al. 1998, 
Defective LPS signaling in C3H/HeJ and C57BL/10ScCr mice: mutations in Tlr4 gene. In: Science 282 (1998), pp. 
2085-2088. 
42  NIH: NAID biodefense research agenda for CDC category A agents. Progress Report, August 2003. 
<http://www.niaid.nih.gov/biodefense/research/bioresearchagenda.pdf>. 
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 3.1 Some Pertinent Facts about the Immune System 
 
Characteristic of the immune system is its ability to respond to an invasion of the body by 
microorganisms or toxic components in ways that afford protection against detrimental 
effects that could occur. The responses of the immune system include both non-specific 
(innate immune system) and specific (adaptive immune system) components (Table 3.1). 
These react in different ways to antigens (chemical components - mainly proteins and 
polysaccharides), which are substances that can elicit an immune response if they are 
foreign to the host. Microorganisms are composed of a mosaic of many different antigens. 
The immune system reacts to these antigens, mounting defence mechanisms that are 
designed to get rid of the microorganisms. The innate immune system includes 
components that are present and ready for action even before an antigen challenge is 
encountered (e.g. phagocytic cells, complement). Some of these components must be 
activated in order to function, but this activation takes only minutes or a few hours at the 
most. Macrophages, for example, are phagocytic cells that represent a prominent cellular 
component of innate immunity. These cells do not recognize antigens in a specific manner 
but react to classes of antigenic substances from microorganisms called pathogen-
associated molecular patterns or PAMPs.  
The cellular and molecular components of innate immunity are less specific than those of 
the adaptive system; that is receptors on macrophages can detect classes of substances 
and microorganisms, but not uniquely specific structures. For example, many bacteria 
carry the substance lipopolysaccharide (LPS) on their cell surface. LPS is a classic 
activator of macrophages. The macrophage recognizes LPS and reacts to this agonist, but 
it is not able to recognize from which bacterium the LPS comes. Nevertheless, the innate 
immune system represents the all-important first line of defence against pathogens and is 
absolutely essential for keeping an infection in check before adaptive immunity can be 
induced. If innate immunity is malignly attacked, the battle against infections is lost from 
the start.  
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 Table 3.1.  Features of Innate and Adaptive Immunitya 
 
Feature Innate Immunity Adaptive Immunity 
Characteristics 
  
Specificity for 
microorganisms 
 
Relatively low (PAMPs)b 
 
High (specific antigens) 
Diversity Limited Large 
Specialization Relatively stereotypic Highly specialized 
Memory No Yes 
 
Components 
  
Physical and chemical 
barriers 
Skin, mucosal epithelia; anti-
microbial chemicals e.g. 
defensins 
Cutaneous and mucosal 
immune systems; secreted 
antibodies 
Blood proteins Complement Antibodies 
Cells Phagocytes (macrophages, 
neutrophils), Natural killer 
cells 
Lymphocytes (B cells that 
produce antibodies; T cells 
that carry out cell-mediated 
reactions) 
 
a  From A.K. Abbas, A.H. Lichtman, and J.S. Pober, Cellular and Molecular Immunology, 3rd Edition, 
(Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1997) 
b  PAMPs: pathogen-associated molecular patterns 
 
The cellular components of adaptive immunity (B and T lymphocytes) can recognize 
antigens in a highly specific manner. However, these cells must be driven by antigens to 
go through different phases of activation and expansion (multiplication of cells) as well as 
differentiation in order to carry out their functions, e.g. the production of antibodies by B 
lymphocytes and the destruction of pathogen-infected cells by T lymphocytes. Therefore, 
adaptive immune responses take days to activate, rather than the minutes or hours 
required by innate immune responses. Additionally, adaptive immunity has a “memory” that 
allows a quicker and stronger response the next time that specific pathogen is 
encountered. Thus, adaptive immunity affords a high degree of specific protection, but it 
takes time to be induced. 
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 3.2 Immune Evasion Strategies 
 
An area of immunological research that is advancing at an extremely rapid pace is the 
elucidation of the mechanisms that pathogens use to evade immune defences. In order for 
a microorganism to be pathogenic, it must have some mechanism(s) that permits it to 
evade immune defences. There is a great deal of interest in studying these processes with 
the aim of developing means of countering evasion strategies. At the same time, 
exploitation of evasion strategies with malign intent should be of particular concern. Some 
evasion strategies are described below. 
 
 
3.2.1 Antigenic Variation 
 
Some microorganisms frequently mutate or vary their antigenic composition so that they 
can no longer be recognized by the antigen receptors of immune system cells. With regard 
to particular antigens, some microorganisms exhibit a much higher mutation rate than is 
normal. This is encountered, for example, in connection with the flu virus, the AIDS virus or 
the causative agent of Lyme disease, Borrelia burgdorferi. This is one reason these 
infectious diseases are resistant to vaccination. In addition, some microorganisms are 
subject to mutation due to pressures exerted by the immune system itself.43 In this regard, 
those antigens that elicit the strongest immune response will be subject to the greatest 
immune selection pressures.  
 
 
3.2.2 Regulation of Complement Activity 
 
One of the most important components of immunity is the complement system. This is a 
series of some thirty or so substances in blood serum that become activated in a series of 
reactions during an immune response.  
This is an example of the importance of system balance. Insufficiencies in key components 
of complement would result in a devastating outcome with regard to certain infectious 
diseases, despite the use of antibiotics or other chemotherapeutic agents. On the other 
hand, unrestrained complement activation would cause severe damage to bystander cells. 
In a healthy body, complement activity is held in check by a variety of regulatory factors, 
known as regulators of complement activation (RCA).44 
Members of the poxvirus, herpesvirus and retrovirus families produce substances that 
mimic RCA proteins and are thus able to escape complement action.45 The smallpox virus 
Variola major causes a serious, virulent infection in humans, while the virus that is used for 
vaccination against smallpox, vaccinia virus, usually causes only a very mild or even 
unapparent infection, at least in individuals with an intact immune system.  
                                                 
43  Gupta, S./Ferguson, N./Anderson, R.: Chaos, persistence, and evolution of strain structure in antigenically diverse 
infectious agents. In: Science 280 (1998), pp. 912-915. 
44  Goldsby, R.A./Kindt, T.J./Osborne, B.A./Kuby, J.: In: Immunology, fifth edition. New York: W.H. Freeman and 
Company 2003. 
45  Alcami, A./Koszinowski, U.H.: Viral mechanisms of immune evasion. In: Trends in Microbiology 8 (2000), pp. 410-418; 
Tortorella, D. et al.: Viral subversion of the immune system. In: Annual Review of Immunology 18 (2000), pp. 861-926. 
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 A component of the smallpox virus that may contribute to its pathogenicity or ability to 
cause disease is the smallpox inhibitor of complement enzymes (SPICE). SPICE has the 
ability to inactivate one of the key complement components (human C3b) that serves to 
induce the innate immune process by which cells engulf material which is eventually 
digested, destroyed or killed. By inactivating the complement activity, a vital area of innate 
immunity would be disabled. Vaccinia virus also has a complement regulatory protein 
(called vaccinia virus complement control protein, VCP), which is, however, much less 
effective (100-fold less) than SPICE. In a recent investigation into the relevance of SPICE 
in pathogenicity, researchers mutated the VCP gene of vaccinia virus to have the same 
nucleotide sequence as SPICE.46 The recombinant mutant VCP proved to be much more 
efficient than normal VCP in inactivating complement in a test tube reaction. Although the 
researchers did not actually outfit vaccinia virus with this mutated gene, the work was only 
one step away from this manipulation. Presumably, vaccinia virus with the mutated gene 
would be much more pathogenic.  
 
 
3.2.3 Regulation of Cytokine Activity 
 
Macrophages of the innate immune system produce type I interferons (α and β), which are 
essential for a successful defence against many viral infections. They are also potent 
producers of proinflammatory cytokines including interleukin 1 beta (IL-1β), IL-6 and 
tumour necrosis factor alpha (TNFα), which mediate reactions designed to fight infections. 
When these cytokines are produced in moderate amounts, they induce mild inflammation 
reactions and contribute greatly to defence mechanisms directed against pathogens and to 
the healing process in general. If they are produced in particularly large amounts or 
continually during chronic illnesses, this can lead to various disorders such as coronary 
insufficiency, thrombus formation, and in some cases even to shock and death.47 This 
makes these activities particularly vulnerable to malign modulation such as by targeting the 
TLRs to induce hyper-responses, or by inhibiting key components in cellular signalling 
cascades that would upset the balance.  
Anti-interferon strategies are a part of the immune evasion repertoire of most viruses. 
These mechanisms include the production of soluble versions of interferon receptors, 
which act as decoys. These decoys bind and inactivate interferons before they reach their 
“destination” - normal, membrane-bound receptors.48 Other cytokines, such as IL-2, IL-4, 
IL-10 and IL-12 (produced by T lymphocytes and macrophages) are essential in directing 
the activities of different arms of the immune system. One of the most interesting evasion 
mechanisms identified in recent years is the mimicry of cytokines and cytokine receptors 
by large DNA viruses (herpesviruses and poxviruses). Cytokine homologues might redirect 
the immune response for the benefit of the virus, for example by suppressing the anti-viral 
activity of cytotoxic T cells, as was evidenced in the famous mousepox experiment.49 
Alternatively, viruses that infect immune cells might use these homologues to induce 
signalling pathways in the infected cell that promote virus replication.50 Furthermore, 
soluble cytokine receptors made by the virus might neutralize cytokine activity before the 
cytokines could react with their normal, membrane-bound receptors. 
                                                 
46  Rosengard et al. 2002, op. cit. 
47  Rietschel, E.T./Brade, H.: Bacterial endotoxins. In: Scientific American 267 (1992), pp. 54-61. 
48  Alcami/Koszinowski 2000, op. cit. 
49  Jackson et al. 2001, op. cit. 
50  Alcami & Koszinowski, 2000, op. cit. 
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 3.2.4 Inhibiting Programmed Cell Death 
 
A further immune evasion strategy includes the production of a variety of viral inhibitors of 
cell death (apoptosis), the so-called programmed cell death. In this regard, apoptosis can 
be viewed as a response to limit the intracellular propagation of viruses. T Lymphocytes of 
the adaptive immune system recognize a cell that has been infected by a virus through the 
presentation by that cell of fragments of viral proteins bound to MHC molecules on the 
surface of the cell. This recognition leads to the activation of cytotoxic T lymphocytes which 
attack and kill the cell through the induction of apoptosis.  
Some viruses can cause the suppression of the production of MHC molecules. This would 
mean that viral antigens would not be bound to MHC molecules and could not be 
recognized by T cells. The cell and therefore the virus production factory would be 
protected from cytotoxic T lymphocyte destruction.51 Alternatively, viruses such as 
cytomegalovirus induce the expression of a certain type of MHC molecule that can bind a 
receptor on the surface of natural killer cells, inducing suppression of the activity of these 
cells that are normally an important component of innate immunity.52  
 
 
3.3 Vulnerability of the Immune System to Modulation with Bioregulators 
 
In addition to immune evasion by pathogens, there has to be a great deal of concern about 
the possibility of modulating immune responses in a negative way with bioregulators that 
are not microorganisms, but rather substances found normally in the body that regulate 
biological processes.  
The inappropriate production of proinflammatory cytokines can be taken as an example of 
malign use of bioregulators. Enhancing the proinflammatory cytokine production by using 
PAMPs to engage Toll-like receptors on the surface of macrophages could at the very 
least lead to sickness behaviour, which is characterized by fever, drowsiness, lethargy and 
loss of appetite.53 However, if the proinflammatory cytokines are produced in particularly 
large amounts, this could lead to autoimmunity, or eventually even to shock and death.54 
On the other hand, inhibiting the production of these cytokines by using bioregulators that 
can negatively regulate their synthesis might result in a lack of innate immune protection.  
A second example of modulation of immune responses with bioregulators concerns ‘super-
antigens’. The immune system is particularly vulnerable to attack by certain super-
antigens. Normally, less than 0.01% of B or T lymphocytes respond to a particular antigen. 
In contrast, a number of super-antigens has been described that can react with a 
significant proportion of T lymphocytes (between 5–25%).55  
For example, the bacterial product Staphylococcus enterotoxin B (SEB) is a biological 
agent that also falls into the category of a potential chemical weapon. This toxin was on the 
                                                 
51  Ibid. 
52  Carayannopoulos, L.N./Yokoyama, W.M.: Recognition of infected cells by natural killer cells. In: Current Opinion in 
Immunology 16 (2004), pp. 26-33. 
53  Inui, A.: Cytokines and sickness behaviour: implications from knockout models. In: Trends in Immunology 22 (2001), 
pp. 469-473. 
54  See Rietschel & Brade 1992, op. cit. 
55  See Goldsby et al. 2003, op. cit. 
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 US list of favoured anti-personnel agents as early as 194956 and was apparently 
weaponized by the US Army prior to the negotiation of the BWC.57 It has also been the 
subject of extensive research in the biomedical literature. SEB acts as a super-antigen in 
that it can activate a large proportion of T lymphocytes to produce excessive amounts of 
cytokines, which can cause systemic reactions including inflammation, fever, widespread 
blood clotting and shock.58  
Recently, a B cell superantigen (protein A from the bacterium Staphylococcus aureus) has 
been described that can bind up to 50 % of the B cell population59, resulting in an 
increased rate of apoptosis or death of the bound cells. The researchers of this B cell 
superantigen are considering putting it to therapeutic use.60 They are engineering the 
antigens to achieve higher binding affinities and different specificities in order to specifically 
target malignant B cell populations such as lymphoma and leukaemia.  
 
 
3.4 Targeted Delivery of Bioregulators 
 
The possibilities for misuse of bioregulators are intricately involved with dual-use aspects 
of targeted delivery technology. Targeted delivery systems are comprised of components 
that allow an activity to be targeted to a particular site in the body where that activity is 
desired. While they may be potentially very useful in vaccine and gene therapy, they can 
also serve as delivery vehicles for dangerous toxins or bioregulators. There are several 
potential means of achieving this. 
One example of a targeted delivery system are viruses that are used as vectors to 
transfect a foreign gene into cells for the purpose of immunization or for gene therapy. 
Infection with the virus would lead to the production of the substance encoded by that 
foreign gene, for example, a foreign antigen. This is an area of intensive research because 
of the interest in developing these systems for gene and cancer therapy.61 Although many 
questions remain concerning the safety of these systems for therapy purposes,62 this 
would presumably be of little concern for a proliferator. A great deal of recent work has 
been invested in the development of lentivirus (the subfamily of retroviruses to which the 
AIDS virus belongs) delivery systems, as these viruses are very efficient in infecting cells 
and achieving stable expression of the transferred genes in those cells. Although 
lentiviruses normally have a very narrow host range, this can be broadened or altered by a 
process called pseudotyping.63 This involves engineering lentiviruses to contain new 
surface proteins derived from other enveloped viruses that govern the ability of the virus to 
infect particular cells. This is what is known as changing the tropism of a virus. In any case, 
                                                 
56  Moon, J.E.v. C.: Chapter 2. The US BW Program: dilemmas of policy and preparedness. In: Wheelis, M./Rozsa, 
L./Dando,M.R. (eds.): Deadly Cultures: Bioweapons from 1945 to the Present. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
(2006). 
57  Geissler, E./Lohs, K.: The changing status of toxin weapons. In: Geissler, E. (ed.) Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1986), pp. 36-56. 
58  See Goldsby et al. 2003, op. cit. 
59  Silverman, G.J. et al.: The dual phases of the response to a neonatal exposure to a VH family-restricted 
staphylococcal B cell superantigen. In: Journal of Immunology 161 (1998), pp. 5720-5732; Goodyear, C.S./Silverman, 
G.J.: Death by a B cell superantigen: in vivo VH-targeted apoptotic supraclonal B cell deletion by a staphylococcal 
toxin. In: Journal of Experimental Medicine 197 (2003), pp. 1125-1139. 
60  Minton, K.: Immune evasion. Germ warfare. In: Nature Reviews Immunology 3 (2003), pp. 442-443.  
61  Thomas, C.E./Ehrhardt, A./Kay, M.A.: Progress and problems with the use of viral vectors for gene therapy. In: Nature 
Reviews Genetics 4 (2003), pp. 346-358. 
62  Check, E.: Harmful potential of viral vectors fuels doubts over gene therapy. In: Nature 423 (2003), pp. 573-574. 
63  Cronin, J./Zhang, XY/Reiser, J: Altering the tropism of lentiviral vectors through pseudotyping. In: Current Gene 
Therapy 5 (2005), pp. 387-398. 
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 it is evident that cytokines as bioregulators of the immune system can be delivered quite 
effectively by viruses engineered to carry the cytokine genes.64  
Alternatively, molecules can be engineered to contain the toxic portion of a toxin linked to 
an antigen specific for a particular cell receptor.65 This antigen would direct the toxin to 
cells having that receptor. Such engineered molecules are called fusion proteins. As an 
example, a fusion protein enabling the action of a cytokine (interferon beta, a bioregulator) 
at sites of inflammation has been constructed.66 
Aerosolization of vectors carrying foreign genes could represent an effective delivery 
system, especially if the vector is a virulent microorganism, as most infections begin at the 
mucosa (mucous membranes). If the bioregulator is not a microorganism, such as in the 
case of cytokines, super-antigens or fusion proteins, successful delivery by the aerosol 
route would depend greatly upon the physical and chemical properties of that vector. The 
US Army in its medical biodefence programme has apparently investigated the absorption 
of endogenous bioregulators through the aerosol route. It has reported, for example, that 
the hormone insulin and the proinflammatory cytokine IL-1 were effective in aerosol form in 
basic pulmonary absorption studies.67 There is considerable interest in developing better 
aerosol delivery systems for drug delivery,68 so that this is an area that should be followed 
closely. In this context, applications of nanotechnology to improve drug targeting combined 
with improved methods for absorption are of particular interest.69 Indeed, there is a 
growing need to analyze these systems carefully and to assess their applicability for 
delivering substances to the desired targets in a BW-relevant context.  
                                                 
64  Jackson et al. 2001 op.cit. 
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 4 Malign Misuse of Neuroscience 
 
Only in the last few centuries has the link between the brain and behaviour become clear, 
and only at the end of the nineteenth century was it demonstrated that the nervous system 
was made up of billions of separate nerve cells or neurons. We now know that during 
evolution complex networks of such neurons have developed in order to effect certain 
behaviours. Whilst the neurons of the central, peripheral and autonomic nervous systems 
vary enormously in form and function, they can be classed into three broad groups: 
sensory neurons which convey information into the central nervous system; effector 
neurons which carry information out of the central nervous system to muscles and other 
effector organs; and interneurons within the central nervous system which link the sensory 
and effector neurons and also have links with one another.  
Information is conveyed within individual neurons by electrical means - generating nerve 
impulses which can be recorded and displayed on an oscilloscope. In the twentieth century 
it was shown that information is conveyed between neurons by chemical means. When a 
nerve impulse (an action potential) travelling along the long extension or axon of a neuron 
arrives at a junction (or synapse) with another neuron, it causes the release of a 
neurotransmitter chemical from the presynaptic cell. This chemical affects the electrical 
properties of the postsynaptic neuron through its interaction with specialised receptor 
proteins embedded in the surface membrane of the postsynaptic cell. It has been shown 
that there are numerous kinds of neurotransmitter chemicals which, depending on the 
specific receptors involved, can either cause an electrical change which enhances the 
possibility of an action potential occurring in the post synaptic cell, or, alternatively, 
decreases that possibility. Various chemical mechanisms ensure that the neurotransmitter 
is cleared from the synaptic area so that its effect does not persist and so that another 
action potential in the presynaptic neuron can exert its effect in turn.  
This then is the basis for modern insights into how the brain - and therefore behaviour - 
can be manipulated by chemical means. Clearly, as our understanding of the neuronal 
circuits underlying specific behaviour increases, and we understand more about the 
neurotransmitters functioning in such circuits, we have more chance of helping people who 
are suffering from various malfunctions of the nervous system (mental illnesses). It has to 
be accepted, however, that such information may be misused by those with malign intent. 
Thus in the early years of the east-west Cold War, following the serendipitous discovery of 
chemical agents (drugs) that could help people with severe mental illnesses, the military 
took an interest in many different means of chemical incapacitation. The original 1970s 
study, CB Weapons Today,70 from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) states that the United States Army Chemical Corps drew attention to at least a 
dozen mechanisms in the late 1950s and it gives details on, for example, hypotension, 
emesis and disturbance of body temperature and further, lists loss of balance, muscular 
hypotonia, muscle tremors, and ‘many different psychotropic effects’ on the central 
nervous system produced by tranquillizers, sedatives, anti-depressants and 
psychotomimetics. At that time the SIPRI authors argued that there was too little 
knowledge of the workings of the central nervous system for such central effects to be 
used successfully to incapacitate. It has been argued since that the genomics revolution of 
the 1990s will have made a significant difference because the structure of the receptor 
sub-types affected by relevant neurotransmitter chemicals has increasingly become 
                                                 
70  SIPRI: The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume II of CB Weapons Today. Stockholm: Almqvist and 
Wiksell 1973, pp. 288-308. 
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 known.71 It would thus be much easier to design chemical incapacitating agents today to 
achieve specific effects.72 
The genomics revolution, however, clearly has much more profound implications for our 
understanding of biological systems - including those of the central nervous system. As a 
recent major review noted, the possibility of a systems-level understanding is gaining 
importance because: 
 
“[...] progress in molecular biology, particularly in genome sequencing and high-
throughput measurement, enables us to collect comprehensive data sets on 
system performance and gain information on the underlying molecules [...]”73 
 
From this viewpoint, what has changed is not just that the genomics revolution has 
enabled the elucidation of the receptor sub-types involved in central nervous system 
circuits, but that the molecular mechanisms in whole control systems governing particular 
behaviours may be elucidated. Another recent review suggested that our increasing ability 
to understand complex signalling relationships in the central nervous system will enhance 
the possibility of finding new therapeutic drugs.74 The attraction of a systems approach 
combining the expertise of engineers, biologists and mathematicians,75 while in addition 
building on the growing capabilities of neuroimaging, is undoubtedly powerful. How far then 
do we understand how behaviour is controlled by systems within the brain? Great progress 
is evident in some areas, and brain circuits and neurotransmitter/neuroreceptor functions 
are being elucidated as the brief following example illustrates. 
 
 
4.1 Noradrenaline/Arousal 
 
There has been a clear military interest in manipulation of the noradrenaline 
neurotransmitter system in relation to the arousal level of the central nervous system for 
some time.76 That interest apparently continues, one recent report suggesting that drugs 
affecting the system were “appropriate for immediate consideration as a non-lethal 
technique”.77 
Noradrenaline is a small-molecule, classical, neurotransmitter which has an unusual 
distribution in the mammalian central nervous system.78 The major noradrenaline cell 
group is the locus coeruleus (LC group). The locus coeruleus contains a surprisingly small 
number of neurons, some 20,000 in the rat. However, these neurons have axons which 
                                                 
71  Dando, M.R.: Scientific and technological change and the future of the CWC: The problem of non-lethal weapons. In: 
Disarmament Forum 4 (2002) pp. 33-44. 
72  Dando, M.R.: The Danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention from Incapacitating Chemicals. In: CWC Review 
Conference Paper No. 4, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (2003) available at 
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ligome and beyond. In: Science 295 (2002), pp. 1662-1664. 
74  Davidov, E.J. et al.: Advancing drug discovery through systems biology. In: Drug Discovery Today 8 (2003), pp. 175-
183. 
75  Henry, C.M.: Systems biology: Integrative approach to drug discovery. In: Chemical and Engineering News 19 May 
2003, pp. 45-55. 
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 branch profusely in the brain, so noradrenaline acts as a neurotransmitter in many different 
brain regions. 
Not surprisingly, noradrenaline transmission is involved in many brain functions, including 
“arousal, vigilance, learning and memory.79 Extensive studies in rats, cats and monkeys 
have elucidated much of how this system functions in arousal and vigilance.80  
Though the detailed operations of this noradrenaline system are complex, and though it 
may have greater involvement in vigilance than just with arousal levels, one simple point is 
of particular interest to those with malign intent. The noradrenaline neurons have 
autoreceptors that are inhibitory: production of noradrenaline limits its own production.81 
Thus it has been found that drugs which affect such receptors in the same way as the 
noradrenaline natural transmitter (agonists) will, if given in sufficient quantity, put the 
animal (or human) to sleep. Not surprisingly, one military report in the early 1990s noted 
that such compounds “have been considered to be ideal next generation anesthetic agents 
which can be developed and used in the Less-Than-Lethal [Non-Lethal] Technology 
Program.82 
It is obvious in that regard that increasing understanding of receptors and their sub-types 
becomes important. It has been known for over 50 years that there are two broad classes 
of receptors for noradrenaline termed α- and β-adrenoceptors, both of which are slower-
acting G protein-coupled receptors (GCPRs) located on cell membranes. The coming of 
molecular biology allowed the genes for six human α-adrenoceptors to be identified (α1A, 
α1B, α1D and α2A, α2B and α2C).83 
Studies are now in progress to elucidate the nature of numerous polymorphisms in the 
nine different sub-types of human α- and β- adrenoceptors and the role, if any, these play 
in various diseases.84  
 
 
4.2 Investigation of the Possibilities 
 
There are many examples in the current literature that amply demonstrate how different 
the present capabilities are in comparison to those of the 1950s. The following are 
therefore only illustrative of the dangers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79  Editorial: New vistas for an old neurotransmitter. In: Biological Psychiatry 46 (1999), pp. 1121-1123. (Introduction to a 
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81  Fernandez-Pastor, B./Meana, J.J.: In vivo tonic modulation of the noradrenaline release in the rat cortex by locus 
coeruleus somatodendritic alpha2 adrenoceptors. In: European Journal of Pharmacology 442 (2002), pp. 225-229. 
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Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 1989-94. 
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 4.2.1 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
 
The human species has evolved mechanisms to ensure that dangerous events are well 
remembered for the obvious good reason. If this response gets out of hand we call it post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It clearly causes great distress to those who suffer from 
PTSD, and it is not too difficult to discern that the condition involves at least two 
components: learning and memory.”85 We are clearly dealing here with learning about 
aversive events and consolidation of the memory of such aversive events. The basic 
elements of the system for dealing with fearful events is built into all mammals.  
If we are in a wood and see a stick that might possibly be a snake we are better reacting 
immediately as if it were indeed a snake. However, while the amygdala pathway prepares 
for action, the cortex pathway is simultaneously processing the information, and if it 
decides that what is seen is actually a stick and not a snake little effort is wasted as it can 
switch off the emergency response.  
However, the amygdala is involved not only in “the acquired association of cues with 
emotional responses, especially the autonomic and motoric responses elicited by fear”, but 
it also “mediates the consolidation of long-term explicit memories of emotionally arousing 
experiences by influencing other brain regions involved in memory consolidation.”86 It is 
this second process of memory consolidation that is surely of more interest in relation to 
PTSD. 
Details of the neurotransmitter and neuroreceptor systems and circuits involved in the 
various pathways linked to the amygdala's role in memory consolidation are being steadily 
elucidated.87 The system is very complex88 and is, as yet, far from completely understood. 
Enough is known, however, to suggest that systems biologists will decipher it rather 
quickly. 
The idea of a direct relationship between noradrenaline and memory for emotional events 
has been tested in humans. Healthy subjects were either given a placebo or propranolol 
(which passes the blood brain barriers and antagonises the action of noradrenaline) one 
hour before viewing a series of either neutral or emotionally stressful scenes. One week 
later people who had received the placebo had significantly better memories of the 
emotional slides but those who had received the propanolol did not remember them any 
better than the neutral ones.89 
Dr. Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics in the United States has 
been quoted as saying that propranolol is „the morning-after pill for just about anything that 
produces regret, pain, or guilt.”90 Also, a national co-ordinator for “Vietnam Veterans 
Against the War” agreed and argued that such treatment could “make men and women do 
anything and think they can get away with it”. A different possibility, of course, is that those 
with malign intent might find means - through a chemical agent - to enhance PTSD, not 
prevent it. 
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 We can initially conclude that the new systems biology brought about by the genomics 
revolution and associated scientific advances will undoubtedly open up complex 
behavioural systems not only to benign but also to malign manipulation. In considering the 
latter therefore, we have to ask just what might soon be open to manipulation. 
 
 
4.2.2 Reassessing Cold War Research 
 
An initial approach to a more systematic investigation of the possibilities clearly is to look 
back at what was done in the Cold War period. It is important not to underestimate the 
scientific effort involved in that period. For example, a United States General Accounting 
Office report of 199491 noted that from 1952 to 1975 the Army carried out a classified 
medical research programme to develop incapacitating agents that involved 7,120 Army 
and Air Force personnel.  
The original SIPRI study92 quoted a US Army manual of 1968 in which it was argued that 
only two types of chemical agents aimed at the central nervous system were likely to be 
encountered in military use: CNS depressants (such as BZ, cannabinols and 
phenothiazine), which sedate and destroy motivation, and CNS stimulants (such as LSD), 
which cause excessive nervous activity, making concentration difficult and causing the 
inability to act in a sustained, purposeful manner. 
There is no mention of the disruption of peptide neurotransmission here but this is not 
surprising since understanding of this phenomenon would only come later. 
However, by the 1990s there was definite military interest in the potential misuse of 
neuropeptides, as is evident from a 1990 US Army Intelligence Agency report93 on 
incapacitating agents research in European communist countries.  
The 1997 US Army textbook, Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 
drawing on the work carried out between the early 1950s and early 1970s, suggests that 
virtually all psychochemicals can be classified into four groups: stimulants; depressants; 
psychedelics; and deliriants. It suggests that the drugs of interest pass the blood-brain 
barrier with ease and exert their dramatic effects on the functions of the central nervous 
system.94 
Thus the textbook concludes that it is possible to disrupt these higher functions with lower 
amounts of agent than those that are required to produce lethal effects. 
In the United States opioids related to the fentanyl derivative used in Russia to end the 
Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002 were still being researched in the early 1990s, as 
were agents that could affect α2-adrenergic transmitter/receptor systems.95 Also, central 
nervous system processes related to circadian rhythms of sleep and alertness are 
increasingly being manipulated by the military - for example, so that pilots are fit to carry 
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 out extended missions.96 Of course, a great deal more is now known about the systems 
biology of circadian rhythms in mammals, thus opening them up to malign manipulation in 
many ways.97 Though sometimes forgotten, the technology of drug delivery has also been 
revolutionised in recent decades as the pharmaceutical industry seeks more effective 
means of drug discovery. It follows that this necessarily also impacts on the possibilities for 
malign manipulation.98 
Neuroscientists have always placed a strong emphasis on understanding systems. It is 
therefore no surprise to see neurobiology examples being cited in current reviews of the 
new systems biology.99 A final reason for keeping an open mind and a broad approach, of 
course, is the scope and pace of change in the biological sciences in general at the 
present time.  
What follows is therefore best considered illustrative rather than in any way definitive of the 
problems we may face. 
 
 
4.2.3 The Central Nervous System 
 
Before investigating two more detailed examples of potential misuse, it is necessary first to 
describe something of the structure of the human nervous system. This is divided into the 
central nervous system (brain and spinal cord) and the peripheral nervous system.100 
Information from peripheral sense organs is received via afferent pathways and processed 
within the central nervous system. Output from the central nervous system is sent via 
efferent pathways to the somatic nervous system (muscles) and to the autonomic nervous 
system (heart, gut, glands etc.). 
The most useful way to understand this massively complex structure is by reference to its 
growth during development. As the embryo develops, there are at first three primary brain 
regions: the prosencephalon (forebrain); the mesencephalon (midbrain); and the 
rhombencephalon (hindbrain). Within a few weeks the forebrain and hindbrain each divide 
in two. The forebrain gives rise to the telencephalon and diencephalon while the hindbrain 
gives rise to the metencephalon and the myelencephalon. The telencephalon of the 
forebrain then develops into the cerebrum with its hugely expanded, characteristic, 
cerebral hemispheres which cover the top and side surfaces of the brain (Table 4.1). The 
surface of the cerebrum is made up of central nerve cells in areas such as the primary 
motor and somatosensory cortex regions. Other central nerve cells are grouped in deeper 
structures often called nucleii or ganglia. There are also large regions of connecting nerve 
fibres throughout the brain (termed white matter because of the colour of the sheathing 
around the nerve fibres). In general, it can be said that the parts of the brain nearer the 
spinal cord deal with more automatic functions (such as heart and temperature control) 
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 and that higher functions are located more in the forebrain.101 Some of the larger 
structures in the brain which are mentioned later in this chapter are listed in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Some structures of the brain* 
 
FOREBRAIN (Proencephalon) 
Telencephalon 
 Cerebral cortex 
 -  Archicortex 
 -  Hippocampus 
 Basalganglia 
 -  Amygdala 
 -  Striatum 
Diencephalon 
 Hypothalamus 
 Thalamus 
MIDBRAIN (Mesencephalon) 
 Tectum 
HINDBRAIN 
Metencephalon 
 Cerebellum 
 Pons 
Myencephalon 
 Medulla oblongata 
 
* From Dubin, How the Brain Works 
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 4.2.4 Brain Cholinergic Systems 
 
The central nervous system is made up of billions of individual nerve cells (neurons). 
Transmission of information within a neuron is by electrical means and the transmission of 
such nerve impulses can be recorded with suitable equipment. However, most 
transmission of information between neurons or between neurons and effector systems 
(muscles, for example) is by chemical means. The first chemical neurotransmitter to be 
discovered was acetylcholine, a small molecule. Subsequently, many other small molecule 
neurotransmitters, such as noradrenaline and dopamine, have been discovered. More 
recently, it has been discovered that various neuropeptides also function as 
neurotransmitters and that sometimes a particular neuron can employ both a small 
molecule neurotransmitter and a neuropeptide at the same time. 
What is of interest here is that the nerve agents weaponised as lethal agents in past 
offensive programmes interfered with acetylcholine's functions in what are termed 
cholinergic transmission systems. There are two distinct types of cholinergic synapse, a 
synapse being a junction between presynaptic and postsynaptic nerve cells where 
information is transferred. At one of these types of synapse the effect of acetylcholine can 
be mimicked by nicotine and at the other it can be mimicked by muscarine, a chemical 
extracted from a mushroom. Despite such differences, the acetylcholine produced at all 
cholinergic synapses is destroyed by an acetylcholinesterase enzyme so that its effects 
are not prolonged.  
The weaponised nerve agents were found to bind to acetylcholinesterase and thus to 
inhibit its action. Consequently, cholinergic synapses were flooded with acetylcholine and 
death from the consequent malfunction of essential body systems quickly followed.102 
The incapacitating agent BZ, which was also weaponised by the United States in the 
1960s, interferes with the operation of acetylcholine at muscarinic synapses in a different 
way. BZ locks onto the receptors of the postsynaptic cell in this type of synapse and so 
prevents acetylcholine exerting its normal effects.103 As most of the cholinergic synapses 
in the brain are of the muscarinic type, BZ was found to have severe effects on behaviou
(Table 4.2). It does not appear, however, that BZ was ever used in warfare. This is hardly 
surprising because the effects were too wide-ranging to be predictable in any particular 
individual. The question here is whether advances in neuroscience have produced a 
situation in which more controllable changes in behaviour could be produced. 
r 
                                                 
102  Sidell, F.R.: Nerve Agents. In: Sidell, F.R./Takafuji, E.T./Franz, D.R. (eds), Medical Aspects of Chemical and 
Biological Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, US Army (1997), pp.129-180. 
103  Ketchum/Sidell 1997, op.cit. 
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 Table 4.2 Effects of BZ on human beingsa 
 
Rapid pulse 
Dry mouth and blurred vision 
Poor co-ordination 
Restless activity 
Stupor 
Confusion, incoherence, hallucinations, disorientation 
Irritable, suspicious and uncooperative 
Inability to solve problems or remember information 
 
 
a From Dando, A New Form of Warfare104 
 
Nicotinic receptors act by the transmitter simply opening a pore in the post-synaptic neuron 
membrane and thus allowing a flow of ions which changes the electrical characteristics of 
that cell. Muscarinic receptors operate differently. These act via various G-proteins to 
change both the electrical and more complex metabolic activities of the post-synaptic cell. 
To date, five different muscarinic receptor sub-types (M1-M5) have been discovered.105 The 
odd numbered muscarinic receptors excite the post-synaptic cell whilst the even-numbered 
receptors decrease its electrical activity. 
As the revolution in the life sciences has progressed, it has become possible to breed 
different strains of mice each lacking one of the different sub-receptor types (so-called 
'knockout mice') and to discover where the different sub-types are to be found in the brain 
and what their different functions are in these different locations.106 The inhibitory 
receptors may be located on the presynaptic neuron and function there as inhibitory 
autoreceptors. Such results are obviously of great interest to those trying to help people 
with Alzheimer's disease. 
If a selective agonist could be found for the M1 receptor it might be possible to increase 
the level of excitation in the cortex and make up for the deficiency in acetylcholine, but this 
approach has not proved to be successful. Another possibility is to find a selective 
antagonist to the M2 receptor and thus to block the inhibition of the presynaptic cell and 
increase the production of acetylcholine back to functional levels.  
Several drug companies are pursuing this strategy.107 Clearly, however, it could also be 
possible to find a chemical which acted in such a way as to be more effective agonist at 
M2 receptors than the natural transmitter. Such a chemical might therefore provide a 
                                                 
104  Dando, M.R. 1996, op.cit., especially Chapter 6. 
105  Felder, C.C. et al.: Therapeutic opportunities for muscarinic receptors in the central nervous system. In: J. Medical 
Chemistry 43 (2000), pp. 4333-4353. 
106  Bymaster F.P. et al.: Use of M1-M5 muscarinic receptor knockout mice as novel tools to delineate the physiological 
roles of the muscarinic choliergic system. In: Neurochem. Res. 28 (2003), pp. 437-442. 
107  Lachowicz, J.E. et al.: Discovery of SCH211803, a high affinity, selective M2 receptor antagonist and a novel 
approach to treatment of Alzheimer's disease. In: Soc. Neurosci. Abstr. 27 (2001), p. 679. 
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 specific disruption of function instead of the multiple and unpredictable disruption caused 
by BZ. 
So far we have discussed something of the neurobiology of awareness, fear, and 
cognition. But these higher functions rest on a whole set of more automatic homeostatic 
functions. These kinds of functions are normally regulated from centres in lower parts of 
the brain near the junction with the spinal cord. In a more comprehensive treatise of this 
chapter108 we consider a further aspect of one regulatory system – sleep – and, in 
particular, one of its manifestations, narcolepsy.  
                                                 
108  Kelle et al. 2006, op. cit. 
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 5 Malign Manipulation of the Neuroendocrine-Immune 
System 
 
Concerns about biological weapons and biological terrorism have increased over the last 
decade and especially since the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States. There 
has been a growing belief that large-scale biological weapons attacks are becoming more 
likely.109 The medical profession has been amongst those groups which have devoted 
more and more attention to what might need to be done in the event of an attack. 
If standard accounts of the effects of well-known biological weapons agents are reviewed - 
like those of agents on the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Category A list such as 
smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers - it becomes 
very apparent that easy diagnosis of the cause of any such attack would be far from 
straightforward.110 If people had fallen victim to any one of a number of different biological 
weapons agents on the Category A list, they would often present with the same “flu-like” 
symptoms. This would also be true for some of the lesser agents on the Category B and C 
lists. 
Not surprisingly, medical specialists have begun to consider how their particular expertise 
might be best used to assist in patient diagnosis and better care. It has been argued that 
neuroscience is one of the specialties that can be recruited to help deal with a biological 
weapons attack should such an event occur. 111 
The connection between neuroscience and possible biological attacks with classical 
agents may not be readily apparent to the general public, but the connection with 
immunology is perhaps less surprising. The body's immune system is its defence 
mechanism, so when the victim of an attack begins to be affected by an invading micro 
organism it is to be expected that the defence mechanism will be activated. What may still 
be a surprise is that microorganisms have evolved means by which to invade or even to 
attack the defensive immune system itself.  Several examples of this have been presented 
in Chapter 3. 
The interactions between potential biological weapons agents and the immune and 
nervous systems can be extremely complex. This is well illustrated by the case of the 
Category B - but previously weaponised - incapacitating staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
(SEB).112 Although this was probably not clear when the toxin was weaponised by the 
United States in its early Cold War offensive biological weapons programme, SEB exerts 
its incapacitating effects through a particular action on the adaptive immune system (see 
chapter 3). The toxin was particularly attractive to weaponeers because of the very low 
dose required to incapacitate: 
 
 
 
                                                 
109  Karwa, M. et al.: Bioterrorism: Preparing for the impossible or the improbable. In: Critical Care Medicine 33 (2005), 
pp.575-595. 
110  For an overview of the three lists see <http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp>. 
111  Prakosh, K.M./Lo, Y.L.: The role of clinical neurophysiology in bioterrorism. In: Acta Neurol. Scand. 111 (2005), pp. 1-
6. 
112  Ulrich, R.G. et al.: Staphylococcal enterotoxin B and related pyrogenic toxins. In: Sidell, F.R. et al. (eds), Medical 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General, US Army (1997), 
pp.621-630. 
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 “[...] The dose that is incapacitating for 50% of the human population exposed 
(also called the effective dose [ED50]) was found to be 0.0004µg/kg, and the dose 
that is lethal for 50% of the human population exposed (LD50) was estimated to be 
approximately 0.02µg/kg, both by the inhalation route.” 113 
 
The effective dose, though much lower than that required for synthetic chemicals, was 
additionally much smaller than the lethal dose. This fact made the toxin more potentially 
usable for incapacitation.  
The impact of administration of the toxin, however, is not confined to the immune system. 
It has recently been demonstrated that there are also quite significant changes induced in 
the endocrine (hormonal) and nervous systems and even behavioural changes. It has 
been shown that administration of SEB activates the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal 
(HPA) stress response axis.114  
 
 
5.1 Neural Regulation of the Immune System 
 
In order to survive, living organisms have to maintain a relatively stable internal 
environment. This stability is threatened by both internal factors, such as a disease 
process, and external factors such as stress. Human and animal bodies have therefore 
evolved complex regulatory (homeostatic) mechanisms which counteract such disruptive 
factors and re-establish the internal stable state. 
Of interest here is how the nervous system responds to stress, as was briefly described in 
Chapter 4. The central nervous system can impact on the immune system in two ways, via: 
 
“[...] (a) the hormonal stress response and the production of glucocorticoids, and 
(b) the autonomic nervous system with the release of noradrenaline [...]” 115 
 
The central nervous system can also affect the immune system through the peripheral 
release of neuropeptides but that issue will not be addressed here. What is of particular 
interest is the brain’s response to stressors through the hypothalamus producing 
corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH, also referred to as corticotropin-releasing factor or 
CRF), which stimulates the pituitary gland to produce adrenocorticotropic hormone 
(ACTH), which in turn causes the adrenal gland to secrete the immunosuppressant 
glucocorticoids. Whilst the mechanism is clearly complex, with many other feedback loops 
being involved,116 this hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is the essential element 
for our purposes here. The total HPA general adaptive response can also be activated by 
immune cytokines (such as interleukins) produced in reaction to pathogens. Then, as in 
response to stress, the glucocorticoids eventually generated inhibit the further production 
of such cytokines. 
                                                 
113  Ibid. 
114  Pacheco-Lopez, G. et al.: Behavioural endocrine immune-conditioned response is induced by taste and superantigen 
pairing. In: Neuroscience 129 (2004), pp. 555-562. 
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pp. 125-63. 
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(1992), pp. 854-66. 
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 There is now an accumulation of evidence which shows that deregulation of this system 
can cause a variety of diseases. As a background paper from the US National Institutes of 
Health summarised recently: 
 
“Ideally, stress hormones damp down an immune response that has run its 
course. When the HPA axis is continually running at a high level, however, the 
damping down can have a downside, leading to decreased ability to release the 
interleukins and fight infection. […] Conversely, there is evidence that a depressed 
HPA axis, resulting in too little corticosteroid, can lead to a hyperactive immune 
system and increased risk of developing autoimmune diseases - diseases in which 
the immune system attacks the body’s own cells [...]” 117 
 
This evidence comes from a very wide range of sources. For example, subjecting animals 
to quite modest levels of stress can greatly affect their ability to fight bacterial infection of 
cutaneous injuries.118  
At a different level, there is much evidence of the impact of the nervous on the immune 
system in humans.119 Even short-term stress can have an effect. For example, students 
sitting examinations were found to have a significantly slower (40%) rate of healing of a 
wound on the hard palate if the wound was made three days before an examination than if 
it was made in the same individuals during the summer vacation. Interleukin-1 levels - an 
important indicator of immune function - were also substantially lower during the 
examination period. 
Stress is also involved in the modulation of the immune responses through mechanisms 
involving the neurotransmitter serotonin. This is a biologically active amine that plays a 
prominent role in the regulation of processes such as mood, appetite and sleep. During 
neurotransmission, serotonin is released from neurons into the synaptic cleft between 
cells. The amount of serotonin available for neurotransmission in the synaptic cleft is 
regulated largely by the serotonin transporter involved in the reuptake of serotonin after it 
has been released.120 
In this regard it is also becoming clear that there are individual differences at the genetic 
level which can have a major bearing on response to stress. One recent study reported on 
847 white New Zealanders who had been tracked from birth in the early 1970s through to 
adulthood.121 It had been found that there are two forms of the gene for the serotonin 
transporter. The two versions are labelled short and long and of the people studied 17 per 
cent had two copies of the short version, 31 per cent had two copies of the long version 
and 51 per cent had one copy of each. Startlingly, the researchers found that having one 
or two copies of the short version had a pronounced behavioural impact: 
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 “Among people who suffered multiple stressful life events over 5 years, 43 percent 
with one [the short] version of the gene developed depression, compared to only 
17 percent with [the long][...] version of the gene [...]”122 
 
It was also found that people with only the long version of the gene were no more subject 
to depression - no matter how many stressful events they experienced - than those totally 
spared stressful events. 
The gene involved has a slight variation in a region which acts to control the switching on 
and off of transporter protein production. The short variant makes less protein and 
therefore there is a longer binding and function of the serotonin neurotransmitter before it 
is cleared from the synapse. Significantly, hypothalamic corticotropin-releasing hormone 
neurones are known to receive a positive input from serotonin neurones.123 Severe 
depression, of course, resembles a chronic stress response with production of high 
glucocorticoid levels possibly being responsible for lower immune system functions.124 
 
 
5.1.1 Malign Manipulation? 
 
The question then is how might such an increased level of understanding of these 
interactions be misused by those intent on causing harm? Given the complexity of the 
interactions, there could be many possibilities. One obvious possibility which stands out in 
the literature is the link between the disruption of metabolism and frailty in old age. 
Frailty is not a simple characteristic to define, but it clearly includes factors such as loss of 
muscle strength and weakness, limited mobility, being underweight and failing to use 
nutrients effectively.125 There appears to be a strong link between high levels of circulating 
interleukin 6 (IL-6) and frailty. IL-6 plays a role in many diseases that are major 
contributors to disability in the elderly, such as coronary heart disease, stroke, congestive 
heart failure, osteoporosis, arthritis, depression and dementia.126   
Not surprisingly, given such findings, IL-6 is not normally detected in the serum of healthy 
young individuals unless there is trauma, infection or stress. Then, IL-6 is expressed and 
contributes to typical inflammatory processes. If IL-6 levels are increased in healthy 
individuals it is very likely that this would have severe effects. From our point of view here it 
is interesting to note that glucocorticoids have been shown to inhibit IL-6 production in a 
range of different tissue types. The gene is regulated via a number of routes including 
corticosteroid interaction with the glucocorticoid receptor (GR) leading to the binding of the 
IL-6 promoter and thus to inhibition of the gene. Theoretically at least, one could consider 
the possibility of an irreversible blockage of the GR preventing such inhibition and leading 
to continuous overproduction of IL-6 with the consequent disablement of those affected - 
even the young and healthy. 
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 5.1.2 Molecular Mechanisms 
 
At the beginning of this chapter we referred to the work of the US National Institutes of 
Health. In a summary of the work of the NIH section on Neuroendocrine Immunology and 
Behaviour the chief of the section, Esther Sternberg, summarised the different levels of 
analysis being carried out. These ranged from the systems level (e.g. neuroendocrine 
responses) to the neuroanatomical level (e.g. peptide expression in the brain) through the 
cellular level (e.g. hypothalamic cell neurohormone and neuropeptide production) to “[...] 
the molecular level (glucocorticoid receptor, estrogen receptor, other nuclear hormone 
receptors, cytokine and cytokine receptors) [...]” 127 
It is, of course, at this molecular level that the current mechanistic approach to biology 
brings the greatest possibilities for knowledge that can be used for good in medicine or ill 
in hostile applications.  As noted in previous chapters, what is of particular importance is 
the impact of the genomics revolution on our understanding of cellular receptors and 
receptor mechanisms in response to intercellular signalling molecules. There is obviously 
considerable medical interest in glucocorticoids because of their wide range of 
physiological functions both in relation to the stress response and a range of other vital 
endocrine functions. Researchers therefore face the problem of finding selective drugs 
which will activate one function only without causing side-effects due to other functions. 
Additionally, as well as glucocorticoid receptors there are other steroid hormone receptors 
which can react to the same glucodorticoids and therefore cause further effects. 
Consequently, “the identification of more selective functional ligands remains a goal of 
clinical and pharmaceutical research.”128 
The understanding of corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) and CRF receptors has also 
undergone remarkable development in recent years.129 CRF receptors, of course, belong 
to the class of G protein-coupled receptors and are two types, CRFR1 and CRFR2. It has 
been found that CRF itself has a ten-fold higher affinity for CRFR1 over that for CRFR2. 
The tissue distribution of the two receptor types in the brain appears to be rather clearly 
related to their physiological functions, with CRFR1 being located in anterior pituitary 
corticotropes and being stimulated by CRF to activate the release of ACTH. There is 
another burgeoning line of research activity which strongly suggests involvement of CRF 
and associated ligands and receptors in anxiety behaviours and depression.130  
What is important to note is that our increasing understanding of molecular mechanisms 
(derived from the genomics revolution) is allowing a very rapid accumulation of new 
knowledge which may be used for benefit or for hostile purposes.  
 
 
5.2  Immune Regulation of the Nervous System  
 
Infection is one of the main natural stimuli for modulation of the nervous system by the 
immune system. In this way, the immune system signals to the brain that there is a present 
danger of infectious microorganisms. Signalling is accomplished in one primary manner 
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 through the action of proinflammatory cytokines (cytokines causing inflammation reactions) 
such as interleukin 1 beta (IL-1β), tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNFα) and IL-6, which are 
produced by cells of the immune system (primarily macrophages) after contact with 
microorganisms or their products.131 The cytokines gain entry into the circulation from sites 
of the immune response in tissues and organs, and subsequently trigger reactions in the 
brain collectively known as sickness behaviour, which is characterized by fever, 
drowsiness, lethargy and loss of appetite.132  
The mechanism of fever induction has been studied most extensively. The brain is 
protected from the potentially harmful effects of biologically active substances or cells in 
the circulation by the blood-brain barrier, which is manifested by the extremely tight 
junctions between the endothelial cells lining blood capillaries133 that prevent circulating 
substances of a particular size and chemical property (as well as cells) from entering the 
brain. Proinflammatory cytokines are of a sufficiently large size that makes it unlikely that 
they can pass the blood-brain barrier. However, numerous pathways to explain how 
cytokines produced in the periphery can influence central nervous system events have 
been studied. For example, highly localized windows in this barrier known as 
circumventricular organs, which are sites that have blood capillaries with open junctions, 
allow passage of cytokines from the circulation into the brain. Evidence suggests that such 
windows are located in the anterior area of the hypothalamus.134 
The cytokines entering the brain at this point bind to their receptors on cells in this area of 
the hypothalamus and induce them to produce the biologically active substance 
prostaglandin E2 (PGE2). PGE2 subsequently binds to its receptors on cells in the 
thermoregulatory center of the hypothalamus and induces reactions in neurons involving 
cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP, a signaling molecule) and neurotransmitters to 
elevate the temperature set point.135 Alternatively, it is also known that the proinflammatory 
cytokines interact with the endothelial cells lining the blood vessels of the hypothalamus 
and induce these cells to produce PGE2, which can apparently cross the blood-brain 
barrier into the anterior hypothalamus. There is also indication that cytokines are actively 
transported through specific carriers across the blood-brain barrier. A further possibility in 
overcoming this barrier lies in the findings that afferent nerve fibers of the vagus nerve may 
transport inflammatory cytokines to the thermoregulatory centers of the hypothalamus.136 
In addition, there is evidence that the blood-brain barrier becomes more penetrable with an 
increasing immune response, and that activated T cells of the immune system can readily 
enter the brain parenchyma, whereas non-activated T cells are excluded under normal 
conditions.137 
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 5.2.1 Malign Manipulation? 
 
In the preceding section possible ways in which the immune system can regulate functions 
of the nervous system were briefly examined. Some of the consequences of using these 
regulatory elements with malign intent will now be discussed in more detail. 
Proinflammatory cytokines can have several different effects on the nervous system. As 
may be recalled, these cytokines include IL-1β, TNFα and IL-6, all of which can apparently 
induce the state known as sickness behaviour, including fever, sleepiness, lethargy, loss of 
appetite and body weight loss. However, although IL-1β and TNFα do without a doubt 
contribute to the febrile response, the production of IL-6 is apparently crucial. This was 
seen in experiments with transgenic mice that were manipulated to overproduce a naturally 
occurring antagonist of the receptor for IL-1β (IL-1ra), which blocks IL-1β effects. Systemic 
injection of LPS still triggered a febrile response in these mice. Similarly, LPS could induce 
fever in mice lacking receptors for TNFα. However, neither LPS, IL-1β nor TNFα could 
induce fever in IL-6 deficient mice.138  
Nevertheless, TNFα and IL-1β can be considered just as significant in mediating sickness 
behaviour, because TNFα can induce the production of both IL-1β and IL-6, while IL-1β 
can induce the production of IL-6.139  
Another effect of IL-1β and the other proinflammatory cytokines on the central nervous 
system is the induction of the production of corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) from the 
hypothalamus.140 IL-1β is a major upregulator of CRF. In an earlier part of this chapter, it 
was discussed how CRF can lead to suppression of immune responses through its action 
on the pituitary to secrete ACTH, which in turns acts on the adrenal gland to induce the 
production of glucocorticoids. However, CRF has a profound effect on the nervous system 
as well. In this regard, overproduction of the hormone has been implicated with 
neurotoxicity and neurodegeneration in animal studies. In addition, CRF has been 
implicated with major depression, anorexia nervosa and Alzheimer’s disease.141  
The immune system is involved in many illnesses associated with the nervous system, and 
one can see a clear division of these types of disorders, which are a reflection of the 
elements of immunity that are thought to be involved. Innate immune responses are 
associated with neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
diseases, in which proinflammatory cytokines and complement components are present in 
the central nervous system. On the other hand, specific antibody and T lymphocyte 
responses (adaptive immune responses) to acetylcholine receptors are seen in 
myasthenia gravis, while antibody responses to the glutamate receptor, which cause the 
blockade of glutamate-mediated synaptic transmission, are apparent in Rasmussen 
encephalitis, resulting in epilepsy. The occurrence of these diseases with the involvement 
of various components of innate and adaptive immunity shows that such elements can 
indeed have devastating effects on the nervous system, when the delicate balance 
between activation and inhibition is broken. 
When considering the possibility of using components of the immune system with malign 
intent, the question arrises as to the feasibility of targeting these elements to the central or 
autonomic nervous system. In its medical research work on endogenous bioregulators the 
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 US Army has reported that IL-1 was effective in aerosol form in basic pulmonary 
absorption studies.142 It therefore stands to reason that administration of IL-1β in aerosol 
form might indeed be an effective delivery system for inducing sickness behaviour in a 
population.  
Another possibility to be considered is the delivery of a substance through a vector, such 
as a bacterium. Apparently the former Soviet Union in its offensive biological weapons 
programme experimented with the production of weapons designed to affect the central 
nervous system. One of the proteins studied was myelin basic protein (MBP), which is a 
substance used in the investigation of experimental autoimmune encephalomyelitis (EAE). 
Apparently soviet scientists were successful in transferring the gene encoding the MBP 
into Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of plague.143 Presumably, upon infection with the 
bacterium, the gene would be activated, MBP would be produced and initiate an 
autoimmune immune response. This agent was thus conceived as a super weapon 
designed to cause two devastating diseases if it would work. What experiments were 
actually carried out was not reported. 
A further possibility is to deliver the substance through a viral vector. Delivery of the 
cytokine IL-4 in the mousepox experiment by incorporating the gene into the mousepox 
virus was quite successful, albeit with a devastating outcome.144 The possibility of 
manipulating a viral vector to gain neural tropism is not too far fetched, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. It should also be recalled that an ongoing immune response145 and even stress 
itself can increase the permeability of the blood-brain barrier. 146  
Finally, aerosol delivery of peptides via the nasal route is being actively explored and 
seems to be promising in connection with drug delivery research. Nanotechnology 
combined with improved methods for absorption of substances across mucous 
membranes is making the delivery of peptide drugs much more feasible than in the past.147 
The nasal route is of particular interest because it can possibly provide direct access to the 
brain by entry into the olfactory bulb via axonal transport along nerve cells.148 
 
 
5.3 Compounded Assault 
 
We talk of the nervous system, the endocrine system and the immune system as if they 
were separate entities. This mode of analysis comes about because of the different 
pathways by which neuroscience, endocrinology and immunology have developed within 
the history of biology. In fact, of course, in the living organism these systems are 
thoroughly integrated in order that the animal (or human) functions in a unified way. 
Indeed, it is rather surprising that in recent years there has been so much surprise at the 
findings that demonstrate how closely the immune system is linked to the other two 
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 systems. There is a fine network of checks and balances exerted on the operation of all 
three systems by the elements within each of them. The perturbation of the function of one 
system will invariably have profound effects on the operation of the others. All three 
systems are interconnected through the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis via cytokines, 
hormones, neurotransmitters, peptides and their receptors, and also through innervation of 
neural and lymphoid organs and even cells of the immune system themselves. 
Here then is an ideal target for those with malign intent. Clearly, if the complex balancing 
feedback system briefly illustrated in this chapter could be disrupted by the use of a 
bioregulator, an ideal method of incapacitation would be available to the attacker. From the 
point of view of potential malign manipulation, it follows that there is necessarily a new 
level of complexity. If malign manipulation of one system can affect two or three systems 
the defender’s problem of diagnosis and treatment increases out of all proportion to the 
attacker’s effort. 
 43
 6 Assessing the Adequacy of the CBW Prohibition 
Regimes for the Challenges of the 21st Century 
 
Multilateral prohibition regimes are more than the legal texts on which they are based. In 
addition to this legal dimension, the concept of “international regimes” captures the political 
dimension of states acting on their own (at the domestic level) and interacting with one 
another (at the international level) in the implementation of these legal arrangements. As 
states participate in international regimes of their own free will, there is an expectation that 
they will try to comply with the stipulations of the regime. In addition, as these regimes are 
often created to overcome collective action problems, participating states can be expected 
to have an interest in adapting a regime when the character of the underlying problem 
changes.  
Certainly the bar for what qualifies as “best practice” in setting up arms control regimes is 
much higher today. This best practice standard finds its expression in a number of features 
of the regime like the availability of verification measures, or alternatively, procedures to 
provide transparency, the strength of the norms that are guiding state action, the provision 
of sanctioning mechanisms, the universality of the control measures agreed upon, and the 
adaptability of the regime structure to changing circumstances. 
Although all of these features impact on the effectiveness and robustness of the CBW 
prohibition regimes, it is the last of the above characteristics, i.e., the regime’s capacity to 
adapt to S&T change, which we are especially interested in. We therefore first summarize 
the current revolution in the life sciences, thus broadening again our discussion of the 
selected areas presented in the preceding three chapters. This will be contrasted with the 
evolution of the two prohibition regimes which takes place in slow motion. 
 
 
6.1 Life Sciences on the Fast Track 
 
 
6.1.1 The Biotechnology Revolution 
 
It was not until the advent of the “Golden Age” of bacteriology at the end of the 19th century 
that a scientific understanding of the nature of infectious diseases began to be acquired.149 
The fundamental mechanism of evolution was elucidated by Charles Darwin some one 
hundred and fifty years ago. It took another one hundred years before the structure of the 
hereditary material -DNA - was deciphered by Watson and Crick and another fifty years for 
the structure of the human genome to be described. Now discoveries at the core of biology 
are coming thick and fast. A look at what has followed from the Human Genome Project 
can give a clue as to how the biotechnology revolution might evolve. 
As an example, new methods for DNA synthesis (e.g. on microchips) as well as new 
methods of error correction will reduce the cost and time for synthesizing long stretches of 
DNA. These capabilities will allow biologists to investigate more effectively many critical 
processes, but they will also, for example, increase the ability to synthesize new viral 
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 pathogens. Some of the people involved in this work have recognized the dangers and 
suggested the need for better controls.150   
Other techniques related to the manipulation of DNA are also advancing rapidly. These 
include, for example the technique of DNA shuffling (the breaking up of DNA sequences 
and recombination of the fragments into many related versions), and the technique of RNAi 
(RNA interference), which is emerging as the most potent, effective and practical method 
of interfering with or silencing the expression of a specific target gene.151 
Another emerging technology that is “on the threshold of synthesizing new life forms” 152 is 
that of synthetic biology, which is the design and assemblage of interacting genes into 
circuits in order to direct cells to perform new tasks. The aim is to be able to develop 
artificial models of how circuits work in nature and then to test out the predictions from the 
models in circuits that have been built in living tissues.153 This technology is one of the 
most difficult to master and requires concerted effort from different disciplines such as 
engineering, computer science and biology.154 Nevertheless, surprisingly rapid progress 
can be made in seemingly complex problems. Indeed, it has “opened up extraordinary 
possibilities for biomedical discovery and environmental engineering”, but at the same time 
the “scope for abuse or inadvertent disaster could be huge”.155 
The relative new area of systems biology looks at interacting physiological systems and 
seeks to understand how all the parts of the body operate as a whole. It is “an emerging 
field that is characterized by the application of quantitative theoretical methods and the 
tendency to take a global view of problems in biology.”156 It is not just that systems biology 
offers a promise of a genuinely mechanistic biology which is at the root of this change. 
There are very sound applied technological reasons for the approach to be supported by 
industry. We should expect pharmaceutical companies interested in drug discovery to 
encourage the growth of systems biology. 
By standing back a little from our direct concerns with bioterrorism and biowarfare we can 
also see the value of George Poste’s famous exhortation157 to his colleagues to think well 
“beyond bugs”. Thus, the genomics revolution allowed the structure of many proteinaceous 
cellular receptors to be elucidated, but now that knowledge enables us to more rapidly 
investigate how neuronal and other circuits function (systems biology). There is presently a 
real feeling of accelerating discoveries across many areas of biology as well as at the core. 
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 6.2 Prohibition Regimes Evolving in Slow Motion: Undermining Regime 
Adequacy? 
 
 
6.2.1 The BW Prohibition Regime 
 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there is more to international regimes than the 
treaties they are often based on. In the case of the BW prohibition regime which does not 
have at its disposal an international organization to oversee implementation of the regime’s 
standards for behaviour, the five-yearly Review Conferences assume critical importance in 
this regard. These Conferences offer an important opportunity to take stock of treaty 
implementation, and the final declarations provide useful clues for the shared 
interpretations of regime members on the status of regime adequacy. 
In chapter 2 we have made the point that successive review conferences have found the 
possible misuse of S&T advances in the life sciences to be covered by the scope of the 
BWC. What has changed dramatically over time, however, is the assessment of the 
misuse potential of new scientific developments. For the First Review Conference the three 
Depositary States – United Kingdom, United States of America and the then Soviet Union - 
produced a joint paper on relevant scientific and technical developments.158 The 
assessments made in the paper appear today to have been somewhat optimistic. In regard 
to the new recombinant DNA techniques, for example, the paper states that: 
 
“Although recombinant DNA techniques could facilitate genetic manipulation of 
micro-organisms for biological or toxin warfare purposes, the resulting agents are 
unlikely to have advantages over known agents sufficient to provide compelling 
new motives for illegal production or military use in the foreseeable future [...]”159 
 
How many of us would agree with such sentiments today? 
For the Third Review Conference in 1991 a number of States Parties (Australia, 
Czechoslovakia, Sweden, the UK and the USA) produced contributions for the background 
paper on scientific and technological developments.160 The UK contribution is particularly 
useful for our purposes since it used the same sections as the 1980 paper by the 
Depositary States. It therefore offers the possibility of directly comparing the conclusions. 
For recombinant DNA techniques, now termed genetic modification (GM), the UK 
concluded that: 
 
“[...] There has been steady refinement of those biotechnology aspects other than 
GM that an aggressor nation could misuse in developing an offensive BW 
capability; important among the capabilities that could be misused are techniques 
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 for the large-scale production of natural or modified micro-organisms or toxins 
[...]”161 
 
and it noted that further advances in such capabilities were to be expected.  
As should be expected, the general conclusion had also changed. While stressing that the 
BWC still covered all these developments and that some also had the potential to assist 
the defence, there is no doubting the changed view: 
 
“The current UK view is that worldwide the increase in knowledge of many of the 
pathogenic species of micro-organisms, and the knowledge of toxins and other 
biological agents, and the continuing pace of developments in civil biotechnology 
areas, have further increased the possibilities for production and hostile use of 
biological agents, whether naturally occurring or not.”162 
 
So the situation had progressively worsened over successive five-year periods. This 
general point was also made in the contributions by Australia and Sweden.  
The changing scope of developments was further emphasised by the Canadians who 
produced a special monograph, “Novel Toxins and Bioregulators: The Emerging Scientific 
and Technological Issues Relating to Verification and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention”. This monograph was circulated to all States Parties at the Review 
Conference. The issue of peptide bioregulators was also covered in some detail by the 
United States: 
 
“Their range of activity covers the entire living system, from mental processes (e.g. 
endorphins) to many aspects of health such as control of mood, consciousness, 
temperature control, sleep, or emotions, exerting regulatory effects on the body. 
Even a small imbalance in the natural substances could have serious 
consequences, including fear, fatigue, depression or incapacitation.”163 
 
In general, the United States agreed that “the confidence derived from the belief that 
certain technical problems would make biological weapons unattractive for the foreseeable 
future has eroded”.164 
There is no doubt that there had been a major change in the perceptions of the 
contributors to these background papers between 1980 and 1991. However, the situation 
regarding review and agreed final statements deteriorated significantly thereafter. Although 
the disruption caused by the United States at the 2001 Review Conference prevented a 
final declaration from being made, it is nevertheless possible to examine the background 
paper on S&T changes produced by States Parties and to compare the 2001 versions with 
that of 1991. 
The background paper for the 2001 Review Conference had contributions from Bulgaria, 
South Africa, Sweden and the United States165 and by the UK166. The South African 
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 contribution began by noting that there were many developments relevant to the 
Convention, but signalled its intention to deal just with biocontrol agents and plant 
inoculants, which is significant because anti-plant biological warfare possibilities are 
frequently neglected. The contribution of Sweden referred to the well-known inadvertent 
outcome of the Australian mousepox experiment and pointedly suggested that it showed 
that even inadvertent outcomes of peaceful research could “play into the hands of those 
with malevolent aims.”   
The UK states that “Given the accelerating pace in science and technology, the UK 
wonders whether it is prudent to maintain a five-year gap between such assessments 
under the BTWC.”  
Significantly, the UK text continued with a specific practical proposal: 
 
“[...]The UK suggests that the upcoming Review Conference consider establishing 
a mechanism for State Parties to work together on a more frequent basis to 
conduct such scientific and technical reviews and to consider any implications at 
the necessary level of expertise.”167 
 
Unfortunately, it would appear that this idea of designing a more adequate collective 
means of assessing and responding to scientific and technological change was lost 
amongst so much else in the chaos of the 2001-2002 Review Conference. 
The events of September 2001 in the US significantly changed many people’s appreciation 
of the dangers, and new concerns began to be raised in public. However, it is questionable 
whether these new concerns have been translated into an overall strengthening of the BW 
prohibition regime. On the multilateral level the Inter-Review Conference process has 
focused on a small number of selected issue areas, and although a substantial amount of 
information has been provided by the States Parties, much is related to national 
implementation of the BWC. This issue should have been addressed three decades ago. 
So at best the current exercise represents an attempt to catch up with BWC 
implementation as it is required under the Convention. 
Not only has the US been instrumental in bringing the work of the Ad Hoc Group to an end, 
it has also increased dramatically biodefence activities.168 If one considers biodefence and 
BW arms control to represent two sides of the same coin in the battle against BW, this 
clearly represents a shift in priorities away from the multilateral enterprise of regime 
building and strengthening towards an increased reliance on national preparedness. 
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 6.2.2 The CW Prohibition Regime 
 
Since the CWC’s entry into force in 1997 CW stockpiles in the declared possessor states 
are being destroyed under international verification and no instances of proliferation among 
CWC States Parties or with their help have been recorded. Thus, taking a narrow 
interpretation of the regime’s purpose, there seems to be no need to worry about the 
regime’s adequacy. 
Proponents of a second view would point to the CWC drafters’ awareness of the fact that 
the CW prohibition regime has to operate in a dynamic scientific and technological 
environment. In this regard, the CWC contains tools to make its States Parties aware of 
S&T change – in the form of a scientific advisory board (SAB) – and to address this 
change, either collaboratively between the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat and member 
states or during a regular Review Conference. However, the portfolio of the SAB seems to 
be rather limited and the only full-scale assessment of S&T advances of relevance to the 
CWC was undertaken prior to the first CWC Review Conference. If this exercise is 
repeated for the next Review Conference, the CW prohibition regime will fall into the same 
five-yearly pattern of assessing S&T advances that BWC States Parties have displayed in 
the past. One exception to this pattern was mentioned in Chapter 2 and because of its 
significance it is worth repeating here. The SAB report submitted to the Director General 
pointed out that it was concerned about the development of new riot control agents (RCAs) 
and other so-called “non-lethal” weapons; the science related to such agents was 
developing rapidly and programmes to develop such agents should be closely monitored 
and assessed according to their relevance to the Convention.169   
Our own research confirms the SAB’s assessment that advances in neuroscience 
underlying toxic incapacitants is evolving rapidly. Unfortunately, the SAB’s call for 
monitoring and assessing these programmes up to now seems to have fallen on dead ears 
on part of the CWC’s States Parties. Should this attitude on the part of some influential 
States Parties prevail, it does not bode well for the prospects of the CW control regime to 
be kept up to date and thus be adequate to deal with the challenges ahead. 
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 7 Conclusion: Towards an Overarching Framework 
for Biochemical Controls 
 
The evidence from the life science laboratories is quite clear: there is going to be an 
increasing risk that new discoveries will facilitate both state-level offensive biological 
weapons programmes and sub-state (terrorist) development of biological weapons. For 
over a decade it has been clear that only a wide-ranging integrated web of policies will be 
adequate to prevent this misuse of our new scientific and technological capabilities taking 
place. The web of deterrence170 or web of prevention consists, at the very least, of: 
 
“comprehensive, verifiable, global CB arms control to create a risk of detection 
and a climate of  political unacceptability for CB weapons; 
broad export monitoring and controls to make it difficult and expensive for a 
proliferator to obtain necessary materials; 
effective CB defensive and protective measures to reduce the military utility of CB 
weapons; and  
a range of determined and effective national and international responses to CB 
acquisition and/or use.”171 
 
Thus, the proposed web of prevention encompasses the two CBW prohibition regimes, but 
goes beyond them in that it includes additional defensive, counterproliferation, and supply-
side measures like export controls and the interdiction of shipments that might contribute to 
CBW proliferation. What it does not account for, however, is the paradigm shift we outlined 
in chapter 1 and which has guided the selection of the areas of S&T advances we have 
focused our attention on: the shift from CBW agents and possibilities of their manipulation 
towards the malign manipulation of selected physiological targets in the human body. In 
light of this paradigm shift it might no longer suffice to make all elements of the web as 
strong as possible, to persuade any proliferator contemplating the development of 
chemical or biological weapons that it is more likely that the potential costs far outweigh 
any benefits. 
The question thus becomes how to achieve the appropriate strengthening of the various 
policy elements in the web and how to devise an overarching framework that would tie 
together all the measures that have been proposed and that will be needed additionally to 
account for the paradigm shift allowing future biochemical warfare. Given the slow and 
difficult progress of recent years it is safe to assume that no quick fixes will be available. 
Rather, a slow and iterative process of adapting and expanding existing prohibitions and 
controls both at the national and international level will be required. 
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 7.1 National Measures 
 
Both the CWC and BWC have the requirement that necessary national measures are 
enacted to implement the treaties within States Parties, but the implementation of this 
requirement has been unsatisfactory for both agreements. With its organisation and 
regular meetings the situation in regard to the CWC is beginning to be rectified through the 
operation of a specific action plan.172 Investigation revealed that the reasons for failure to 
implement the national legislative requirement were frequently administrative or 
bureaucratic, not political, so appropriate assistance could greatly assist in effective 
rectification of the deficiency. The BWC has neither an organisation nor regular meetings, 
so development and implementation of such an action plan are far less likely. It may be 
that implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (to be discussed under 
international measures below) will have some effect on BWC national implementation, but 
this cannot be guaranteed. 
 
Considering the importance of implementation it was perfectly appropriate for the first 
(2003) meetings of the Inter-Review Conference process to consider: 
 
“i) the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set 
forth in the Convention including the enactment of penal legislation.”173 
 
The problem, of course, is that the Inter-Review Conference process had a mandate only 
to “discuss and promote common understanding and effective action” on the topics under 
consideration.174 Only at the Sixth Review Conference will the States Parties “consider the 
work of these meetings and decide on any further action.” 
Given the increasing concern over misuse of the life sciences by sub-state actors since the 
initial formulation of the idea of a web of deterrence in the early 1990s, the second topic for 
discussion at the 2003 meetings was also understandable. This was consideration of: 
 
“ii) national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.” 175 
 
No doubt, in a number of countries such as the UK, considerable efforts have been and 
are being made to achieve such goals.176 But the fact remains that consideration of 
concerted international action will only be decided at the 2006 Sixth Review Conference of 
the BWC. 
 
In considering disease monitoring it was recognised inter alia that “strengthening and 
broadening national and international surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of 
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 infectious disease may support the objective and purpose of the Convention” 177, and that 
“the primary responsibility for surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious 
diseases rests with States Parties”. 
Regarding capabilities for responding to cases of alleged use of biological weapons, they 
also recognised that “States Parties' national preparedness and arrangements 
substantially contribute to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious 
outbreaks of disease.” 
However, in a step forward from the 2003 meeting of States Parties, the 2004 report also 
stated that “State Parties are encouraged to inform the Sixth Review Conference of, inter 
alia, any actions, measures, or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the 
[2004] discussions.”178 This will again clearly facilitate the process of strengthening of 
regime implementation at the national level. 
 
 
7.1.1 Codes of Conduct for Life Scientists 
 
In 2005 the Inter-Review Conference process turned to the very different topic of “the 
content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists”.179 This clearly 
raised issues which were well outside the usual range of discussions at BWC meetings, 
brought in a new constituency of interest - life scientists - and brought much more clearly 
into focus the impact of the ongoing scientific and technological revolution. 
Fortunately, the complexities of the subject of codes of conduct were clarified at the 
meeting and as one detailed report noted “there appears to be recognition of the value of a 
matrix of code”.180 These codes would be composed of: 
 
“[...] an overarching set of moral and ethical principles which might have wide 
applicability, a code of conduct which could give guidance and, at the more 
detailed level, an extension to an existing national code of practice which might set 
out steps that need to be taken as a regular process when any new work is being 
considered [...]”. 181 
 
Unfortunately, it also became clear from many sources that life scientists had little 
awareness of the problem of the dual uses - benign or malign - to which their work might 
be applied.182 Thus, to make any progress on the development of codes of conduct within 
the various States Parties to the BWC a major awareness-raising programme will have to 
be undertaken. 
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 7.1.2. Oversight of Research 
 
In one country at least this awareness-raising is beginning in earnest. As previously noted, 
the United States National Academies, in response to growing concerns about the misuse 
of modern biology, set up a committee under the chairmanship of Gerald Fink to examine 
the issues involved. The committee report, “Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma”,183 in part identified seven classes of 
experiments that it felt required prior review. The classes were those which: 
 
“- would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; 
- would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; 
- would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent; 
- would increase transmissibility of a pathogen; 
- would alter the host range of a pathogen; 
- would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities; and  
- would enable weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin.”184 
 
The report favoured a voluntary scheme of self-regulation, but suggested that a national 
board be set up to oversee and develop the scheme. The US government accepted this 
idea and moved to found a National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB). The 
NSABB held its inaugural public meeting in Washington D.C. in mid-2005 and detailed 
explanations of what had been done were given to the BWC meeting of experts in Geneva. 
In chapter 2 we have pointed out that in response to worries about scientific publications 
like that on the mousepox experiment, the editors of a number of major scientific journals 
had agreed on a system of checking submitted papers for possible inadvertent assistance 
being given to terrorists. However, this had resulted in very, very few papers even being 
questioned, let alone modified or refused publication. In light of the questionable value of 
self-regulatory efforts by scientific publishers, the NSABB model was regarded by many as 
an important potential model for other states' national oversight systems in the future. The 
difficulties with the proposed system, however, should not be underestimated. 
What was being proposed as oversight by the Fink Committee appeared to be a tiered 
review system in which experiments in the designated classes would be subject to local 
review and then, if there were difficulties at that level, the national system would become 
involved. A group at the University of Maryland, which had given considerable attention to 
such a tiered review system, has expressed a number of concerns. They suggested that 
the system had to cover all institutions involved in biotechnology research (including civil 
industry and biodefence), that it had to be based on law, not guidelines, and that an 
effective system needed to be international, not just national.185  
Biodefence is a particular concern.186 Legitimate biodefence is permitted under the BWC 
and needs to be appropriately strengthened as part of the overall web of prevention 
against the hostile use of modern biology. But biodefence is necessarily going to be carried 
out in areas of research which are related to offensive possibilities. Certainly, there has 
been a huge increase in biodefence funding in the United States, including that for the 
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 National Institutes of Health which grew “by over 3,200%, from $53 million in fiscal year 
2001 to a record $1.8 billion (requested) in fiscal year 2006”.187 Such increases are always 
likely to raise questions. 
It is generally agreed that the community of practising chemists and their professional 
societies played an important positive role in the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. This positive role has continued, with the International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) making a major contribution on scientific developments for the 
2003 First Review Conference of the CWC. More recently, IUPAC had joined with the 
OPCW in its efforts to develop new educational aids to inform the profession of the 
importance of the CWC. 
The BWC obviously lacks an organisation like the OPCW, but what is less well known is 
that the disparate international professional societies of biologists lack an overarching 
organisation like IUPAC. Getting an international assessment from the world's biologists of 
present and future developments and what might best be done is therefore very difficult. 
The UK Royal Society has argued that there is a need for the BWC to have a Scientific 
Advisory Panel to carry out such assessments.188 This is a sensible idea but, in view of the 
difficulties in agreeing anything to strengthen the BWC,189 it might be that the individual 
national academies will have to pursue this idea as a co-operative venture outside of the 
Convention until the prospects for the international regime improve. 
 
 
7.2 Adapting CBW Controls on the International Level 
 
As outlined in previous chapters attempts to strengthen the BW prohibition regime through 
the negotiation of a legally binding compliance protocol and to adapt the CW prohibition 
regime to changes in chemical industry and S&T advances have either been a complete 
failure – in the case of the AHG work on a BWC Compliance Protocol – or seen rather 
limited success – in the CW realm. The new Inter-Review Conference process established 
by the last BWC Review Conference in 2001/2002 focussed more on national 
implementation measures in the selected areas that were being covered than genuinely 
moving the regime forward.  
However, there have been a few initiatives of an international character that have 
supplemented the two prohibition regimes in the areas of export controls and interdiction of 
NBC-related materials. Two of these will be discussed in the following section. This will be 
followed by a discussion of some proposals that have been made for strengthening the 
regimes through the negotiation of a biosecurity convention, the criminalization of CBW 
and the setting up of a small organisational infrastructure in support of the BWC. Yet, as all 
these proposals fall short of offering a coherent framework in which either their relationship 
to the CBW prohibition regimes is somewhat unclear, or they do not aim to integrate the 
various measures in existence and being proposed, or they do not take into account the 
paradigm shift with which we are concerned, we propose negotiation of a Framework 
Convention on Biochemical Controls (FCBC), a provisional outline of which will be 
presented in the final section of this chapter. 
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 7.2.1. Measures Already Adopted 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was initiated by the US administration under 
President Bush in May 2003. It establishes a framework for “multinational response to the 
growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their 
delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.” 190  
The Initiative started with 11 founding members and has so far attracted support from more 
than 60 additional states. In early 2004 the US signed two Ship Boarding Agreements with 
Liberia and Panama, respectively. This represents a significant step towards 
universalization of the PSI principles as roughly “50% of the world’s shipping volume is 
carried on flag vessels of the core PSI participants, as well as Panama, and Liberia.”191 
Since then similar agreements have been signed with the Marshall Islands (August 2004), 
Croatia (June 2005), Cyprus (July 2005) and Belize (August 2005). 
PSI participants have emphasized the compatibility of the initiative with the two CW and 
BW prohibition regimes. However, as one recent interpretation of PSI as a building block of 
an “increasingly decentralized nonproliferation architecture”192 shows, it represents only a 
partial solution to the wider biochemical threat we are facing: it focuses exclusively on one 
part of the supply side of the proliferation problem – as it does not address intangible 
technology transfers – and does not take into consideration the paradigm shift away from 
pathogens or toxic chemicals as weapons and towards the physiological targets in the 
human body. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004193 addresses some of the limitations 
inherent in the PSI-approach, as first of all the export control measures required under it 
are not excluding intangible technology transfers. It also has a much wider scope than PSI 
prohibiting state support for non-state efforts to acquire NBC weapons, requiring states to:  
 
“adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any Non-State 
actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”.194 
 
Resolution 1540 furthermore requires all states to undertake “appropriate effective 
measures to account for”, “effective physical protection measures” and “appropriate 
effective border controls and law enforcement efforts” in order to secure NBC-weapons 
and related material and prevent their misuse by non-state actors. In addition it calls for 
“appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls” and sets up a 
Committee of the Security Council to examine states’ reports on the status of their 
implementation of Resolution 1540. 
For states already participating in the CW and BW prohibition regimes this is largely a 
reiteration and specification of commitments already undertaken under the BWC and 
CWC. However, the wording in Resolution 1540 makes these stipulations binding on all 
states, including those outside the prohibition regimes and in that sense presents a useful 
step forward in ensuring universality of the norms against CBW. Yet, the wording of the 
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 resolution on the other hand also allows for loopholes in implementation. As it is not 
specified what constitutes “effective appropriate” action, states might simply report back to 
the Security Council Committee set up under the resolution that they are already taking 
such action. Furthermore, the time limitation of the Committee’s activities to two years 
presents an additional limitation on the positive effect the resolution might have. Especially 
when viewed from the perspective of S&T changes in the life sciences, a permanent 
institutional structure to examine states’ control efforts would be much more appropriate to 
monitor and react to the changing threat spectrum.195 
 
 
7.2.2 Additional Measures Proposed  
 
A number of additional measures have been proposed by academics and NGOs to 
strengthen or supplement the CW and BW prohibition regimes. One proposal advocates 
the establishment of international biosecurity standards.196 Like the work by the Maryland 
University group of scholars mentioned above, Tucker focuses on preventive measures 
that could be taken to better secure pathogens that could be misused by terrorists for a 
BW attack. He correctly points out the absence of  
 
“uniform global standards for laboratory security […] on which individual 
states can base national legislation and regulations. This lack of 
harmonization, […], has given rise to gaps and vulnerabilities that must be 
addressed as part of a coordinated global strategy to prevent bioterrorism.”197 
 
Elements of that strategy should include proper accounting mechanisms for pathogens and 
toxins, the registration and licensing of facilities handling pathogens and toxins, the 
establishment of physical security measures, and the screening of laboratory personnel.198 
Although UNSC Resolution 1540 seems to go a long way towards meeting these 
demands, the proposal put forward by Tucker contains much more detail in terms of the 
measures to be taken, aims at the harmonization of national measures, and provides for 
the establishment of an oversight mechanism which incorporates a small secretariat, both 
of which go well beyond the mandate of the 1540 Committee. Thus, agreement on more 
stringent international biosecurity standards along the lines proposed by Tucker could well 
serve as the next stage in the Security Council’s dealing with the bioterrorist threat in 
general and the oversight of pathogenic micro organisms and toxins in particular. Clearly, 
the Security Council would not be the right venue to negotiate such a treaty on global 
biosecurity standards, but its initiation and support of a negotiation process leading to such 
a legally binding instrument could be expected to create a positive momentum for 
negotiations in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly. 
A different new international treaty which would make for a very useful addition to both 
BWC and CWC and thus improve regime adequacy is a “Convention to Prohibit Biological 
and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law”. Such a Draft Convention has 
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 been formulated by the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armaments and Arms 
Limitation.199 While both BWC and CWC require states parties to enact domestic 
legislation which criminalizes the prohibitions contained in these treaties, the new 
convention would put acts involving biological and chemical weapons on an equal footing 
with aircraft hijacking or torture. As pointed out by the authors of the draft convention, 
“[p]urely national statutes present daunting problems of harmonizing their various 
provisions regarding the definition of crimes, rights of the accused, dispute resolution, 
judicial assistance and other important matters.”200  
At its core under the proposed convention: 
 
“[e]ach State Party would be required, inter alia, (i) to establish jurisdiction 
with respect to such crimes according to established principles of judicial law, 
including the principles of territoriality, nationality, protection, and passive 
personality, and (ii) where the state has jurisdiction and if satisfied that the 
facts so warrant, to submit those cases to competent authorities for the 
purposes of extradition or prosecution. Further with respect to actual use of 
biological and chemical weapons, each State Party would be required to 
establish jurisdiction over all persons found on its territory regardless of their 
nationality or place of the offence.”201 
 
While such new international treaties would enhance regime adequacy by increasing the 
norm and rule density in the issue area and thus complement BWC and CWC, other 
proposals are more closely linked to the BWC and have for example explored opportunities 
to address the “institutional deficit” of the BWC.202 This would aim at improving the 
organizational capacities for better implementing already existing normative guideposts of 
the BW prohibition regime. Starting from the assumption that even after the collapse of the 
Ad hoc Group negotiations on a comprehensive organisational structure like the proposed 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons would represent the ideal solution 
for the BW regime’s organisational deficit, Sims argues that 
 
“for the years immediately following the Sixth Review Conference some less 
ambitious proposals must suffice. These might comprise an annual meeting 
of States Parties, or an open-ended meeting of their Bureau, supported by a 
Scientific Advisory Panel and a permanent Secretariat. All would derive their 
authority from the Sixth Review Conference.”203 
 
This latter point is important as it makes clear that any such modest organisational setup 
would not require an amendment to the BWC, involving ratification by states parties. Sims 
builds a well-argued case in support of his proposal, quoting increasing support from BWC 
states parties during the past few years and also pointing to the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT), where states parties have made similar proposals for establishing a 
mechanism for more regular reviews of the treaty than the five-yearly review conferences 
permit. However, as in the case of the NPT, it is not unrealistic to expect resistance on part 
of some states parties to increase formal interactions among BWC states parties between 
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 review conferences. Clearly the US government has made its unwillingness to engage in 
any such activities known.  
 
 
7.3 Bridging the Gaps – Towards a Framework Convention for Biochemical 
Controls (FCBC) 
 
As this brief discussion of a few of the already enacted or at least proposed measures to 
strengthen the BW and CW prohibition regimes clearly demonstrate, all of these initiatives 
and proposals are addressing only a part of the problems identified and practically none of 
them addresses in a meaningful way the paradigm shift in the life sciences we have 
explored in previous chapters and have illustrated by discussing advances in the 
neurosciences and in immunology. What is thus needed is an instrument to bridge the 
existing gaps and address the new challenges looming on the horizon of efforts to prevent 
the misuse of S&T advances in the life sciences. 
We propose that such an instrument could take the form of a new Framework Convention 
on Biochemical Controls (FCBC). Framework conventions fall in the area of soft law which 
does not make legally-binding specific proscriptions for state action. They are a relatively 
new type of legal instrument which has been applied inter alia in the areas of international 
environmental and international health policy. The 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 204 and the 2003 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 205 are 
two examples of such conventions who aim at providing a wider framework for specific 
action to be agreed upon at a later stage. Given the lack of progress towards verification 
measures in the BWC context, it might be advisable to take a step back from the details of 
the two regimes and look at the larger picture of scientific and technological advances.  
While a FCBC will not immediately address the structural shortcomings in the BW 
prohibition regime or improve compliance with the CWC’s stipulations, its longer-term 
benefits would be considerable. They would be located in two areas: firstly, a FCBC could 
provide a bridge between issue areas that so far have been treated largely in isolation. 
This refers to both chemical and biological weapons developments, where an overlap in 
the subject matter, i.e. in regard to toxins, which is being regulated, is widely 
acknowledged, but where an overarching bracket is currently missing. While the separation 
of CW and BW made sense with respect to classical warfare agents and was useful in 
negotiating the BWC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the age of 21st century life 
sciences in which biological processes can be affected at the molecular level, the 
continued distinction will look increasingly out of touch with reality. The FCBC could also 
provide a stronger link between the prohibition of CBW and human rights. So far this link 
has been made only in relation to toxic incapacitants. Secondly, a FCBC could address the 
paradigm shift from the chemical or biological warfare agent as the object of malign 
manipulation to the physiological target in the human body, thereby contributing to the 
continued adequacy of the CBW prohibition regimes.  
In order to provide these benefits the FCBC could be used as a vehicle by states to 
recognize the dual-use potential of biological and chemical agents and materials, 
equipment, technologies and know-how and to express their determination to prevent the 
misuse of chemical and biological agents and materials to incapacitate, kill or purposefully 
harm humans, animals, or plants. An FCBC would provide an opportunity to acknowledge 
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 the accelerating speed of scientific and technological advances in the life sciences and 
related scientific disciplines and also to acknowledge the above mentioned paradigm shift 
in the proliferation problem as knowledge that could be misused to target the human body 
is widely diffused. From this vantage point then, the framework convention should reflect 
the concern that an increased understanding of life processes at the molecular level will 
amplify the misuse potential of biological and chemical agents and materials, equipment, 
technologies and know-how to kill, harm, or otherwise incapacitate. The FCBC should 
make it clear that no person should be exposed to such biological and chemical materials 
without having given a prior informed consent to such exposure. States parties to the 
FCBC should be required to treat any violation of such a stipulation as a criminal act and 
make it punishable under national and international law. Last, but not least, the FCBC 
would have to be drawn up in a way that it does not contradict or detract from existing 
international treaties and other arrangements relating to chemical and biological agents 
and materials, most notably the CWC and BWC. 
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